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RULE 11 AND THE PROFESSION
Georgene Vairo*
INTRODUCTION
T HERE may be no better example than Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11 ("Rule 11")1 of how the law of civil procedure has influ-
enced the legal profession. After it was amended in 1983,2 Rule 11
dramatically altered the conduct of lawyers litigating in federal courts.
Although Rule 11 ultimately was toned down in 1993,1 its impact on
the profession has been profound.
This Article will attempt to relate the ascendancy of Rule 11 over
organized bar discipline, at least with respect to regulating civil litiga-
tion conduct, to the much discussed problem of the decline in profes-
sionalism and the free-fall decline in the public's perception about the
legal profession. Of course, Rule 11 in itself did not cause the decline
in public perception, but its use and frequent abuse exacerbated ten-
sions among lawyers. Hence, Rule 11 became yet another emblem of
* Professor of Law and William Rains Fellow, Loyola of Los Angeles Law
School.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In fact, Rule 11 dramatically shaped my own professional
life as well. Less than three years after it was adopted, and just as I was beginning my
career as a law professor, the New York Times published an article about the notori-
ety of Rule 11 in an article on the front page of the business section. The article
included a pie chart based on statistics about reported Rule 11 cases that I had col-
lected. See Tamar Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, at
D1. After crafting that pie chart, I went on to write several articles about the rule.
See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as Prologue?, 28 Loy. LA. L
Rev. 39 (1994) [hereinafter Vairo, Past as Prologue]: Georgene M. Vairo, Rule H1: A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988) [hereinafter Vairo, Critical Analysis]; Ge-
orgene M. Vairo & Ellen P. Quackenbos, Rule 11: Practice and Problents, in 2 ALI-
ABA Course of Study Materials: Trial Evidence, Civil Practice, and Effective Litiga-
tion Techniques in Federal and State Courts 1167 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo. Rule 11:
Where We Are And Where We Are Going, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 475 (1991) [hereinafter
Vairo, Where We Are]. I also authored a treatise about the Rule. See Georgene M.
Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures (2d ed.
1992 & Supps. 1993-95) [hereinafter Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions]. I have also delivered
countless lectures about the Rule, participated in panel discussions regarding the
Rule, and worked wvith federal and state committees that were studying the Rule,
including the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The critical substantive amendments were adopted in 1983. In 1987, further
amendments became effective which made the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gen-
der-neutral. In 1993, further extensive substantive amendments to Rule 11 became
effective.
Although Rule 11 is a rule of procedure for the federal district courts, many states
adopted a sanctions rule similar to Rule 11. See, for example, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 128.7 (West 1997) and N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 130-1 (1998).
3. See Supreme Court of the U.S., Communication from the Chief Justice of the
United States Transmitting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Forms, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2072, H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, at 15-20 (1993), reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 402, 419-24 (1993).
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the "professionalism problem" facing us. Even though the adoption
of amended Rule 11 in 1983 was in large measure an attempt to deal
with the abuses that undermined civility and professionalism, it ap-
pears that Rule 11 contributed significantly to the further decline in
civility. This, in turn, may have contributed to further undermining
the public's confidence in the profession as well. The availability of
compensatory sanctions made possible by the amended rule also cre-
ated a new form of pernicious attorney conduct: the all-too-frequent
making of Rule 11 motions.
On the other hand, these motions often targeted what many in the
bench and bar believe to be unprofessional or incompetent conduct
that previously had been ignored by organized bar discipline. Indeed,
there can be no argument that Rule 11 has changed lawyer conduct in
some significantly positive ways. Empirical studies about Rule 11
showed that lawyers engaged in more serious pre-filing research than
before, and that they decided after such research not to file marginal
pleadings or motions. In that respect, the judicial enforcement of
sanctions standards has had a more dramatic impact on the regulation
of the profession than the enforcement of ethical codes by disciplinary
authorities. Thus, the sanctions regime initiated by the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 dramatically altered how the profession is regulated,
shifting the onus of regulation of many forms of misconduct from bar
disciplinary boards to the judiciary.4 Or, more precisely, it created a
vehicle for punishing certain kinds of conduct that were largely un-
reachable or untouched before. The open judicial punishment of such
attorney conduct ultimately may help restore confidence in the profes-
sion in ways that the generally still very private disciplinary enforce-
ment of ethical codes do not.
Moreover, the emergence of Rule 11 after 1983 raised the con-
sciousness of the bench and the bar of the need to deal with the
abuses in our civil legal system. The bench and the bar apparently
became more aware than ever of the need to provide a better picture
to the public of lawyers' behavior. The "consciousness raising" engen-
dered by the Rule 11 experience may have provided the boost the
profession needed to develop positive strategies for improving its im-
age and the public's confidence in it.
I will discuss these important effects of Rule 11. Part I of this Arti-
cle will discuss the genesis of amended Rule 11. Part II will discuss
the aggressive enforcement of Rule 11 by the federal courts and detail
the wide range of conduct that became subject to Rule 11. Part III
will review empirical research on Rule 11 to demonstrate the impact
that the rule has had, both positive and negative, on attorney conduct.
4. As Professor David Wilkins has detailed, bar disciplinary processes have been
supplanted or complemented by various other forms of regulation, one of which is
Rule 11. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
799, 822-30 (1992).
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Part IV will show how the judiciary is using Rule 11 to essentially
replace organized bar discipline by imposing a wide range of mone-
tary and disciplinary sanctions. Finally, Part V will discuss the decline
in the public's opinion of the legal profession. Like the attempts of
disciplinary authorities, judicial enforcement of Rule 11 has failed to
curtail all the abuses in the profession or to restore public confidence.
At the least, however, the attention paid to Rule 11, together with the
undermining of public confidence, has led the organized bar to try to
deal with its problems in a positive way.
I. THE RISE OF RULE 11
A. The 1983 Amendments
As is well-known by now to anybody connected with the legal pro-
fession, Rule 11 was amended significantly in 1983. In contrast to its
pre-1983 obscurity, amended Rule 11 met with more controversy than
perhaps any other Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. The debate sur-
passed that which accompanied the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the
class action rule, which liberalized the use of that powerful procedural
device.' In the years since the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, there
have been several major empirical studies published,6 dozens of law
5. Professor Arthur Miller, the Reporter to the Advisory Committee when the
1983 amendments were adopted, has argued that the Rule 11 controversy mimics the
Rule 23 controversy. See Arthur R. Miller, Remarks at the Federal Bar Council An-
nual Winter Meeting (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter Miller, Remarks]; see also Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664, 678-80 (1979) (discussing time needed to
work out problems and effectively implement 1966 amendments to Rule 23). The
amendments to Rule 26(a) in 1993 requiring disclosure of certain materials generated
a large hue and cry prior to their adoption. But once the rule became effective, the
controversy largely disappeared. See Ruth E. Piller, Suggested Rules Seek to Develop
a Kinder, Gentler-and Cheaper-Discovery Process, Litig. News (ABA Litig. Sec.),
July 1998, at 1, 10 ("In districts where initial mandatory disclosure is practiced, it is
generally liked and believed to lessen the costs of litigation."). See generally Lisa J.
Trembly, Mandatory Disclosure: A Historical Review of the Adoption of Rule 26 and
an Examination of the Events that have Transpired Since its Adoption, 21 Seton Hall
Legis. J. 425 (1997) (exploring the problem of discovery abuse and discussing the
amendments to Rule 26).
6. See Stephen B. Burbank, Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third Cir-
cuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank,
Third Circuit Report]; Saul M. Kassin, Fed. Jud. Ctr., An Empirical Study of Rule 11
Sanctions (1985); Committee on Fed. Courts, New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of
the Committee on Federal Courts: Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (19S7); John
Shapard et al., Federal Judicial Ctr., Report of a Survey Concerning Rule 11, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1995) [hereinafter FJC 1995 Report], reprinted in 1 Re-
source Materials: Civil Practice and Litigation in Federal and State Courts § C4 (Sol
Schreiber et al. eds., 7th ed. 1996); Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., Federal Judicial Ctr.,
Rule 11: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States (1991) [hereinafter FJC Final Report]; Thomas E. Willg-
ing, Federal Judicial Ctr., The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process (1988) [hereinafter First
FJC Report]; Lawrence C. Marshall et al., Public Policy: The Use and Impact of Rule
11, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 943 (1992) [hereinafter AJS Study]; Melissa L Nelken, The
1998]
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review articles written,7 several books and monographs published,8
hundreds of reported opinions filed,9 and numerous legal and non-
legal newspaper and bar association journal articles written10 which
explore the reach and impact of Rule 11.
To understand the controversy about Rule 11 and the impact it has
had on the legal profession, it is important to remember the context in
which the rule was first amended. For decades, criticisms of the civil
litigation process became increasingly loud and frequent. For exam-
ple, in 1976, then Chief Justice Warren Burger complained that pro-
fessionalism had declined and that the costs and delays in civil
litigation had become intolerable." For a time, the focus was on curb-
ing discovery abuse. At about the same time, the Kutak Commission
was working on a revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
the American Bar Association. Although there was vociferous debate
about the content of the Rules, 2 as well as the discovery amendments,
from a day-to-day perspective, lawyers, especially litigators, were
more concerned about discovery amendments. These were the rules
that would have a more direct impact on the way in which lawyers
would practice than any changes in disciplinary authority enforcement
of ethics codes or rules would have had.1 3
Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of Califor-
nia, 74 Judicature 147 (1990); Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra note 1, at 199-203; Vairo,
Where We Are, supra note 1, at 478-86.
7. For a listing of law review articles discussing Rule 11, see Vairo, Rule 11 Sanc-
tions. supra note 1, at app. F.
8. See American Bar Ass'n, Sanctions: Rule 11 and Other Powers (Melissa L.
Nelken ed., 3d ed. 1992); Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litiga-
tion Abuse (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997); Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule
11 (1998); American Bar Ass'n, Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11
of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101 (1988), reprinted in Vairo, Rule 11
Sanctions, supra note 1, at app. E.
9. See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 67-81; Vairo, Critical Analysis, supra
note 1, at 199-203.
10. See Michael Bates, Lawyers Say It's Applied Unfairly: The Rule 11 Debate, 4
Years Later, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 12, 1987, at 3; Gregory P. Joseph, Rule 11 is Only the
Beginning, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 62; Gregory P. Joseph, The Trouble With Rule
11: Uncertain Standards and Mandatory Sanctions, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 87.
11. At the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, Chief Justice Burger expressed his alarm at the
"widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are overly tolerant to lawyers
who exploit the inherently contentious aspects of the adversary system to their own
private advantage at public expense." H.R. Rep. No. 104-62, at 9 (1995).
12. See N. Lee Cooper & Stephen F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer In-
age and the Scope of Professionalism, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 923, 928 (1995-96).
13. Of course, there is judicial enforcement of such codes as well, and increasingly
so, of matters such as attorney disqualification and conflicts of interest, as the practice
has become nationalized. Disciplinary authorities, however, continue to regulate
most of the matters covered by the codes, including those over which there is overlap
with judicially enforced rules such as Rule 11. See Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers §§ 1-14 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998).
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In 1980, the Supreme Court adopted discovery rules changes, but
they were characterized by Justice Powell as mere "tinkering
changes."' 4 Moreover, for litigators working at the time, few noticed
much practical difference and business continued as usual. Thus, the
perceived problems did not go away, and the Advisory Committee
began to work again at dealing with the problems the organized bar
continued to complain about.
The 1983 amendments that resulted, in contrast to the 1980 and ear-
lier amendments, did generate change. Indeed, in 1983, a series of
amendments were adopted.15 As with the 1980 amendments, the new
provisions were intended to improve the conduct of civil litigation in
the federal courts. The Advisory Committee adopted two key mecha-
nisms for achieving this goal. First, Rule 16, the pretrial conference
rule, was amended to require judges to become more involved in man-
aging and controlling litigation.16 Second, Rule 11 was amended to
require lawyers to act more responsibly toward the court, rather than
as mere narrow-minded adversaries, with appropriate sanctions, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, looming as the stick.17
The characterization of the 1980 amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as mere "tinkering changes"'" could not be applied
to the 1983 amendments. The requirement that judges impose sanc-
tions, including compensatory sanctions, was unprecedented. Indeed,
1983 may be viewed as a watershed year. From an academic perspec-
tive, the sanctions amendments represented more than a subtle shift in
procedural thinking. After years of trying to cope with the expense
and delays purportedly caused by notice pleading and liberal discov-
ery, the courts and many litigants sought a return to pre-1938 fact
pleading. 19 From a practical perspective, the sub silencio purpose of
Rule 11 may have been a desire to return to "classical lawyering"
when elite segments of the bar controlled the profession." Notice
pleading and liberal discovery arguably made practice too easy in
14. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521,523 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting); see also Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 Cal. L Rev. 806,
806-07 (1981) (discussing the 1980 amendments).
15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 11, 16, 26.
16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1983) (amended 1993).
17. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 190-92
(1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amendments]; cf. City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court, 986
F.2d 1142, 1143 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 11 establishes duties to both the opposing side
and the legal system as a whole that are designed to curb needless expense and delays
and to free the courts from litigation that strains scarce judicial resources.").
18. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. at 523 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
19. See generally Richard L. Marcus. The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1986) (noting that fact
pleading "seems to be enjoying a revival in a number of areas in which courts refuse
to accept 'conclusory' allegations as sufficient under the Federal Rules").
20. See infra Part V.
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what was supposed to be a learned profession.2 Thus, there was a
perceived need to tighten up procedures in an attempt to curtail those
viewed as less professional.22
In any event, there is no doubt that the sanctions provisions of the
1983 amendments, particularly Rule 11, were intended to effect a
change in lawyer conduct, and that shortly after their adoption, they
became the subject of vociferous debate within the bench and bar.
This debate about the operation of the rule led the Advisory Commit-
tee and Judicial Conference to propose major changes in the text of
Rule 11, which became effective in December 1993.23 Though most of
the changes were intended to scale back the more draconian aspects
of Rule 11,24 the mindset occasioned by the 1983 amendments to Rule
11 remained.
B. Why the Focus on Rule 11?
A brief review of the history of sanctions in federal courts25 may
explain why the Advisory Committee used Rule 11 as a way of com-
bating the complained-of litigation abuse. Courts always have had an
inherent power to punish individuals for abusing judicial process.26
Moreover, since 1918, courts have had statutory authority, pursuant to
the predecessor statute to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, to impose excess costs
against attorneys who have "unreasonably and vexatiously" increased
the costs of litigation by "multipl[ying] the proceedings. '27 Neverthe-
less, these sanctions tools were ineffective in curbing abuses.
Sanctions were imposed rarely for two reasons. First, both § 1927
and the court's inherent power required a finding of bad faith.28 Sec-
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 1.08(e).
24. See generally Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note 1, at 52-87 (discussing the
1993 amendments to Rule 11). Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the adop-
tion of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 because they feared that the deemphasis of
compensatory sanctions and the new safe-harbor provision would render the
amended rule "toothless." See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
146 F.R.D. 507, 507-08 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. See Gregory P. Joseph, supra note 8, for an excellent summary and analysis of
all federal sanctions tools.
26. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980). See generally
David W. Pollak, Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse
the Judicial Process, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 619, 619 (1977) (suggesting that "a variety of
virtually ignored sanctions is available to courts"). In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the court's inherent power to
impose sanctions.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994).
28. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765-66 (stating that a finding of bad
faith must precede the award of attorneys' fees under a court's inherent power to
sanction); Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968)
(noting that § 1927 applies only to a "serious and studied disregard for the orderly
processes of justice").
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ond, most judges were notoriously reluctant to impose sanctions even
when faced with apparently serious breaches of professionalism, such
as discovery abuse.29 To counter this reluctance, Rule 37 was
amended in 1970 to create a presumption in favor of awarding ex-
penses unless the opposition to the motion to compel was "substan-
tially justified" or "other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust. ' 30 It was thought that by creating a presumption in favor of
awards, and by using the compensatory phrase "award of expenses of
motion" rather than the punitive word "sanction," the social/moral as-
pect of the judicial reluctance would be ameliorated.
Nonetheless, most judges continued to ignore the presumption con-
tained in Rule 37(a)(4) and did not award expenses to the moving
party with any regularity. 31 One study found that judges usually im-
posed sanctions only after he or she first ordered discovery, gave a
party a second chance to comply, and the failure to comply was willful
or not explained. 32 Judges cited several reasons for declining to im-
pose sanctions: a distaste for becoming involved in discovery disputes
that litigants should be able to resolve themselves; a feeling that liti-
gants should seek sanctions against an adversary only when they have
been without fault in complying with discovery; and a feeling that the
imposition of a sanction embarrasses or humiliates the attorney or
party and should thus be resorted to only in extreme situations.33
Having failed to turn Rule 37 into an effective tool, the Advisory
Committee turned to the feasibility of using Rule 11 to improve attor-
ney conduct.' The Advisory Committee focused on Rule 11 as the
vehicle for implementing its goal of making lawyers more responsible
to the court because it was the only rule dealing with attorney conduct
per se. Since Rule l's original enactment in 1938, an attorney's sig-
nature on a pleading or motion constituted a certification that the at-
torney "has read the pleading [or other paper]; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay."' 35 Promulgated to curb tenden-
cies toward untruthfulness, the effect of the rule was to place a moral
obligation on attorneys to satisfy themselves that good grounds ex-
29. Although some commentators have disputed whether there really was, or is, a
discovery abuse problem, influential members of the profession appeared to believe
that there was in fact a significant problem. Moreover, there was a widely-shared
belief that there was a problem, as evidenced by the extensive attention paid to it by
the legal and mainstream media.
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
31. See Paul R. Connolly et al., Fed. Jud. Ctr., Judicial Controls and the Civil Liti-
gation Process: Discovery 21-26 (1978); C. Ronald Ellington, Dep't of Justice, A
Study of Sanctions For Discovery Abuse 53 (1979).
32. Ellington, supra note 31, at 110.
33. See id. at 111-16.
34. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 198.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, quoted in 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 197.
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isted for the action or defense.36 If the pleading was not signed, if
"scandalous or indecent material" was inserted, or if the attorney vio-
lated the certification, the pleading could "be stricken as sham and
false," and the attorney could be "subjected to appropriate discipli-
nary action."37
Rule 11, however, was largely ignored. Its certification provisions
were described as not read enough, not demanding enough, and not
honored enough.38 Commentators and the 1983 Advisory Committee
noted confusion and lack of clarity as to the standard of conduct appli-
cable to attorneys who signed court papers, specifically the extent of
investigation required and what conduct-bad faith or something
less-would trigger the rule's sanction provision.39 Moreover, attor-
neys did not use the rule against each other; perhaps they were reluc-
tant to go after an adversary for engaging in suspect tactics because
they knew they would want to employ those tactics themselves.
Rule 11 was also thought to be inadequate because of limitations in
the sanction part of the rule. Prior to its amendment, Rule 11 permit-
ted the discretionary imposition of sanctions by the court. If a docu-
ment was unsigned, or signed in violation of the rules, it could be
stricken as sham and false. The striking provision, however, was used
rarely,40 and when it was used, the decisions confused the issue of at-
torney honesty with the merits of the action.4 Whether the courts
had the power to impose monetary sanctions was also in dispute.42
36. See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 1334, at 51 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]; see also Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that lawyers have a
responsibility to ascertain that a reasonable basis exists for allegations before sub-
scribing their names to complaints). See generally J. Patrick Browne, The Significance
of the Signature: A Comment on the Obligations Imposed by Civil Rule 11, 30 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 385, 386 (1981) (stating that Rule 11 "imposes grave moral and ethical obliga-
tions upon attorneys"); D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement:
Some 'Striking' Problems With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1,
14-17 (1976) (stating that enforcement of Rule 11 requires a standard of attorney
honesty which combines standards from both equity and law).
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1980) (amended 1983). See Richard H. Underwood, Curb-
ing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 St.
John's L. Rev. 625, 638-46 (1982).
38. See Arthur R. Miller & Diana G. Culp, Federal Practice: Litigation Costs, De-
lay Prompted the New Rule of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24.
39. See Wright & Miller, supra note 36, § 1335; 1983 Amendments, supra note 17,
at 198.
40. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 199.
41. See id.; see also Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1181, 1189 (E.D. Va. 1980) (refusing to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 11, a meritless claim
because the court was "unable to conclude 'beyond peradventure' that the allegations
[were] sham, false, and devoid of factual basis"), rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 375
(4th Cir. 1981)
42. Courts differed as to whether Rule 11 authorized an award of attorneys' fees
for violation of the rule. For example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Rule 11 provided
no authority for awarding attorneys' fees. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603
[Vol. 67
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The Advisory Committee realized that to make Rule 11 an effective
tool, it had to be revised in several significant ways to: (1) provide a
less stringent standard than bad faith for finding a violation; (2) allow
the court itself to raise the Rule 11 question; (3) provide for man-
datory sanctions; and (4) expressly permit monetary sanctions, includ-
ing attorneys' fees.43  To get at attorney conduct, Rule l1's
certification provisions were revised substantially in an attempt to
clarify what an attorney must do before filing a litigation document."
Under the 1983 version of the rule, an attorney's signature constituted
a five-fold certification that the attorney or party:
[1] has read the [document]; [2] that to the best of [his] knowledge,
information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry: [31 it is well
grounded in fact and [4] is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and [5] that it is not interposed for any improper purpose such
F.2d 100, 103-04 (9th Cir. 1979). It noted that the rule said nothing about disciplining
a party by imposing attorneys' fees upon him for any act of his lawyer, even if his
lawyer willfully violated the rule. See id. at 103 n.2; see also Orenstein v. Compusamp,
Inc., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 466, 469 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Rule 11 does not
provide for imposition of costs or attorneys' fees."). On the other hand, some courts
recognized that attorney's fees and costs may be awarded under Rule 11. For exam-
ple, in Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. I11. 1980), the court
found that attorneys' fees may be awarded in the exercise of its "inherent power"
under Rule 11. See also Badillo v. Central Steel & Wire Co.. 717 F.2d 1160, 1166-67
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that attorneys' fees may be an appropriate sanction under
Rule 11); Textor v. Board of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1395-96 (7th Cir.
1983) (stating that monetary sanctions may be awarded only after a hearing and that
the burden of proof is on the party seeking the award); Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
643 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1981) (concluding that the frivolous nature of contentions
made award of counsel fees and expenses appropriate); Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
630 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (sanctioning an attorney for having abused the
court's process); Public Interest Bounty Hunters v. Board of Governors, 548 F. Supp.
157, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stating that Rule 11 "corroborates" authority to impose
attorneys' fees for abuses of judicial process); LeGare v. University of Pa. Med. Sch.,
488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (denying a motion for costs and fees because
it was too early in the litigation "to make informed judgments as to whether the ac-
tion is groundless").
43. See Miller, Remarks, supra note 5.
44. The new certification and sanction provisions of Rules 7 and 11 are the same.
They are set forth in Rule 11 and incorporated by reference into Rule 7. The lan-
guage of Rule 11 now makes clear that this provision applies to pleadings, motions,
and any other litigation papers. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 196 ("[Rule
7] stated only generally that the pleading requirements relating to captions, signing,
and other matters of form also apply to motions and other papers. The addition of
Rule 7(b)(3) makes explicit the applicability of the signing requirement and the sanc-
tions of Rule 11."). While the Advisory Committee notes that Rule 11's provisions
always had such application, some courts had held that Rule 11 does not apply to
motions. See, e.g., Medusa Portland Cement Co. v. Pearl Assur. Co., 5 F.R.D. 332, 333
(N.D. Ohio 1945) ("Rule 11 provides that a sham pleading may be stricken but con-
tains no such provision with regard to motions."). The Advisory Committee, how-
ever, cautions that while Rule 11 governs discovery motions, the certification
requirements of amended Rule 26(g) apply to discovery requests, responses, and ob-
jections. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 201.
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as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.4 5
Perhaps more significantly, judicial discretion was curbed. Bad
faith findings were not required. Rather, an attorney's conduct would
be put to an objective test, and, to counter their reluctance to impose
sanctions, courts were required to impose sanctions whenever an at-
torney violated the new certification provision. Amended Rule 11
thus represented an aggressive attempt to remedy the ineffectiveness
of its predecessor and other sanctions tools, to prevent abuses, and to
streamline the civil litigation process by dispelling apprehensions that
efforts to obtain enforcement under the rule would be fruitless. The
amendments sought to eliminate any doubt as to the propriety, and
indeed the necessity, of imposing sanctions. The theory underlying
the new mandatory sanction provision was that the mandatory imposi-
tion of sanctions would reinforce attorneys' new certification
obligations.46
II. THE RULE 11 EXPERIENCE
The ostensibly good intentions of the 1983 Advisory Committee ob-
viously would have gone for naught had the bench and bar failed to
apply and to comply with Rule 11 as intended. The 1983 Advisory
Committee's first fear was that amended Rule 11 would be as little-
used as Rule 37. Its other fear was that Rule 11 would be overused. 7
Their second fear became reality. The 1983 Advisory Committee's in-
vitation to use Rule 11 to attack pleadings and motions triggered an
avalanche of "satellite litigation."
Beginning in 1984, the volume of cases decided under the rule in-
creased dramatically. By the end of 1987, the number of reported
Rule 11 cases had plateaued. Even though the number of reported
cases leveled off, motions under the amended rule continued to be
made routinely, especially by defense counsel, as many attorneys were
unable to pass up the opportunity to force their adversaries to justify
the factual and legal bases underlying motions and pleadings.48 In-
deed, one study found that in a one-year period, almost one-third of
the respondents to the survey reported being involved in a case in
which Rule 11 motions or orders to show cause were made. 9 The
same study showed that almost 55% of the respondents had exper-
ienced either formal or informal threats of Rule 11 sanctions.50 The
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (amended 1993).
46. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 198.
47. See Miller, Remarks, supra note 5.
48. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.03(a)(2).
49. AJS Study, supra note 6, at 952-53 (finding that in 7.6% of the survey's cases,
sanctions were imposed, and in 24.3% of the survey's cases, sanctions were not
imposed).
50. See id. at 952, 954-56.
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excessive invocation of Rule 11 ultimately led to the 1993 "safe har-
bor" amendments to Rule 11.51
What caused the explosion of Rule 11 activity? The answer has
three parts. First, there were a number of appellate decisions that sig-
naled that the courts would be serious in enforcing the amended rule
to combat unprofessional conduct.5 2 Second, in most cases in which a
Rule 11 violation was found, the sanction imposed was compensatory
in nature, i.e., costs and attorney's fees.53 Third, once lawyers knew
that the courts would grant sanctions motions, and that the likely
sanction would be an award of costs and attorney's fees, lawyers had
an incentive to bring sanctions motions to achieve cost-shifting, which
otherwise would largely be unavailable due to the American Rule.-
Hence, at this point it is appropriate to discuss the landmark cases that
signaled an aggressive enforcement of Rule 11, and the decisions that
interpreted the Rule to cover various forms of unprofessional conduct
that had never been successfully dealt with by formal disciplinary
processes. 55
A. Aggressive Appellate Control
The reported cases show that the courts of appeals took an active
role in enforcing amended Rule 11. Early courts of appeals cases set
the tone that the amended rule should be interpreted strictly in accord
with the Advisory Committee's intent. This tone, in turn, was sup-
ported by the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of Rule 11.1
As with the district court cases, the number of reported circuit court
cases relating to Rule 11 sanctions grew every year from 1983 to 1987,
and then began to level off.57 By the time Rule 11 was re-amended in
1993, there were over 600 reported circuit court decisions. The courts
of appeals affirmed district courts' awards of sanctions in 38.5% of
appeals, and they affirmed district courts' refusal to award sanctions in
51. See Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note 1. at 63-65.
52. See infra Part II.A.
53. See infra Part II.A.3.
54. See infra Part II.A.3. Pursuant to the American Rule, each party normally
bears the costs and attorney's fees of their litigation. For a discussion of the argu-
ments for and against the American Rule and its exceptions, see Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 Duke U.
651.
55. See Wilkins, supra note 4, at 822-830 (demonstrating why such processes are
ineffective); see also Cooper & Humphreys, supra note 12, at 931 (arguing in favor of
a broad professionalism analysis that looks beyond the Rules). For example, to
demonstrate the broader reach of Rule 11, as discussed above, almost one-third of
lawyers surveyed were involved in cases in which a formal Rule 11 proceeding oc-
curred. Relatively few lawyers, however, are disciplined. In New York, for example,
only 231 lawyers were disciplined in 1997. See Statistics Show Drop in Nutmber of
Lawyers Disciplined, State B. News (New York State Bar Ass'n, Albany, N.Y.), July-
Aug. 1998, at 2, 2.
56. See Vairo, Where We Are, supra note 1, at 486-92.
57. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.02(b)(7).
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30.2% of appeals.5 Thus, courts of appeals agreed with the district
courts in 68.7% of the reported cases.59 Although this figure is some-
what lower than the 80% affirmance rate reported for all types of is-
sues, 60 a two-thirds affirmance rate suggests a more aggressive, but
still limited, degree of control. Not surprisingly, however, it is in the
cases in which the circuit courts disagree with the district courts that
one finds most of the opinions with extensive exposition of the rule, as
can be seen in the next section.61 Between 1983 and 1987, the courts
of appeals reversed sanctions in 19.2% of the cases,6" and reversed the
refusal to grant sanctions in 12% of the cases. 63 Thus, at least during
the heyday of Rule 11, it appears that the circuit courts were rather
aggressive in setting the tone for how the rule ought to be
interpreted.'
1. Rule 11 and Unprofessionalism: The Enforcement
Principle Emerges
As discussed in Part I, Rule 11 was designed to give district court
judges an effective tool to cut down on the abuses that often accom-
pany federal litigation. The brief analysis in the above section sug-
gests that the rule was enforced aggressively. In addition, the
language in many of the early circuit court decisions made clear their
insistence that the district courts apply Rule 11 to ensure that abusive
conduct, i.e., unprofessionalism, be curbed. The cases discussed below
provide examples of how the circuit courts interpreted Rule 11 to at-
tack what they viewed as unprofessional conduct, which was precisely
the conduct that had escaped sanction by organized disciplinary en-
forcement efforts. In other words, the courts emphasized the need for
58. See id. The First FJC Report shows a somewhat different picture. While a
comparable number of decisions affirming the imposition of sanctions were reported
(37.8%), there were fewer cases in which the refusal to impose sanctions was affirmed
(18.9%). See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 81 tbl.15.
59. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.02(b)(7); cf First FJC Report,
supra note 6, at 81 tbl.15 (showing a 56.7% agreement with district court).
60. See, e.g., Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (reporting a
79% affirmance rate for summary judgment motions, which is in line with general
affirmance rate).
61. See infra notes 65-98 and accompanying text.
62. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.02(b)(7); cf First FJC Report.
supra note 6, at 81 tbl.15 (showing a slightly higher reversal of sanctions rate, 24.3%).
63. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.02(b)(7). The First FJC Report
showed that 5.4% of the cases were reversed for refusal to impose sanctions. Perhaps
one reason for the relatively large difference is that this author's study included in this
category cases in which the court refuses to reverse, but opines that there probably
was a violation, or remands. See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 81 tbl.15.
64. The adoption of an across-the-board abuse of discretion standard of appellate
review by the Supreme Court in 1990, however, resulted in fewer reversals of district
court refusals to award sanctions. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1,
§ 8.04(d)(3)-(5) (analyzing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990),
and subsequent court of appeals cases applying the abuse of discretion standard of
review).
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clear enforcement, what we may refer to as the enforcement principle,
despite paying lip-service to the need to avoid chilling effective
advocacy.
Perhaps the earliest important case in this area is Eastway Construtc-
tion Corp. v. City of New York.65 There, a contractor was denied ac-
cess to various redevelopment projects sponsored by New York City.
Upon losing a state court case, it sued the City and others in federal
court, alleging violations of federal antitrust and civil rights statutes.
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.66 The court refused, however, to award sanctions under Rule
11 because, in its view, the case was not frivolous.67
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.6s Judge Kaufman, writ-
ing for the panel, then turned to the City's cross-appeal from the por-
tion of the district court order denying attorneys' fees under Rule 11.
After reviewing the case law and statutes on the American Rule and
its exceptions, the court noted that Rule 11 as amended "'provides a
somewhat more expansive standard for the imposition of attorneys'
fees."' 69 Citing the 1983 Advisory Committee Note, he stated that:
The addition of the words "formed after a reasonable inquiry"
demand that we revise our inquiry. No longer is it enough for an
attorney to claim that he acted in good faith, or that he personally
was unaware of the groundless nature of an argument or claim. For
the language of the new Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously im-
poses an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed. Simply
put, subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once
did.
In framing this standard, we do not intend to stifle the enthusiasm
or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law. Vital
changes have been wrought by those members of the bar who have
dared to challenge the received wisdom, and a rule that penalized
such innovation and industry would run counter to our notions of
the common law itself. Courts must strive to avoid the wisdom of
hindsight in determining whether a pleading was valid when signed,
and any and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the signer. But
where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of
success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable ar-
gument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it
stands, Rule 11 has been violated. Such a construction serves to
punish only those who would manipulate the federal court system
for ends inimicable to those for which it was created. 70
65. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
66. See id. at 249.
67. See id.
68. See id at 254.
69. Id. at 253 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 253-54 (citations omitted).
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Note that the court proclaims in the last sentence that its construc-
tion of Rule 11 would punish only those who "manipulate the federal
court system. ' 71 "Manipulation" of the system connotes an improper
purpose, a willful disregard for the strictures of the rule, and certainly
a lack of professionalism. Thus, Judge Kaufman construed the rule to
permit the sanctioning of those whose practice may be deemed unpro-
fessional. Then, applying its reasonably "competent attorney" stan-
dard, the court found that while neither the plaintiff nor its counsel
had acted in subjective bad faith or to harass the defendants, a compe-
tent attorney, after reasonable inquiry, would have recognized that
the action was "destined to fail."' 72 Accordingly, the court held that it
was error for the district court to deny the defendants' motion for
attorneys' fees and remanded the case for the imposition of sanctions
including attorney's fees.73
Eastway illustrates the "enforcement principle." In an attempt to
deter future unprofessional conduct and frivolous litigation, the court
of appeals undertook a de novo review74 of the district court ruling
that there was no Rule 11 violation and reversed the denial of sanc-
tions. On remand, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, the district judge, wrote a
lengthy opinion focusing on numerous issues which suggested that a
small sanction, $1000, was appropriate.75 The City of New York,
which had incurred almost $53,000 in attorney's fees, appealed once
again. In Eastway II, the Second Circuit decided that although the
district court's decision as to the amount of the sanction was protected
by the abuse of discretion standard, the zone of discretion started at
$10,000.76
If one purpose of Rule 11 is to streamline litigation, it hardly makes
sense to encourage close review of sanctions decisions. Eastway
makes the point dramatically: there were four Eastway sanctions-re-
lated opinions. On the other hand, if the purpose of the rule is to
prevent abuses and to improve professionalism, it makes perfect sense
for the court of appeals to take an aggressive approach. Clearly, in
Eastway we did not learn much about when judges might agree as to
whether a fling suggested that the attorney was "reasonably compe-
tent," or whether a claim is frivolous. We did, however, learn that the
court of appeals meant business, and that the court would insist on
aggressive enforcement of the amended rule.
A Seventh Circuit case provides another example of the enforce-
ment principle. This time, a circuit court attacked a routine, though
71. Id. at 254.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. The standard of review is now an across-the-board abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard. See supra note 64.
75. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987).
76. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1987).
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thoughtless, practice. A problem that arises in many cases is the
"kitchen sink" problem: the filing of boiler-plate claims, defenses, and
motions. While the assertion of such claims does not generally com-
mand much attention from the parties or the courts, respect for the
enforcement principle resulted in a crusade against such practices. In
Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., ' the district court imposed
sanctions on the plaintiff in a civil rights case for filing a frivolous law-
suit.78 Rodgers, who was represented by three attorneys, filed a sev-
enteen-page complaint, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, and an array of claims under state law.79
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and,
sua sponte, found a Rule 11 violation. What appeared to bother the
court the most was the plaintiff's laundry list approach to pleading.'
Indeed, the court conceded that the plaintiff came close to stating a
claim on some theories.8 1 Nevertheless, the court faulted the plain-
tiffs lawyers for inartful pleading and for mixing "worthless claims"
with claims of possible merit:
With even the modest research that is now required under rule 11,
any lawyer admitted to practice before this court quickly should
have determined that this relatively minor incident did not amount
to a federal case of constitutional dimension. At any rate, what
would not have been done after proper research was what occurred
here: the filing of a ponderous, extravagant, and overblown com-
plaint that was largely devoid of a colorable legal basis. This was a
clear-cut violation of rule 11.8 2
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 3 The plaintiff was sanctioned for
throwing in the kitchen sink even though some claims may well have
been actionable. Indeed, one commentator demonstrated that cases
cited by plaintiffs lawyers showed that these claims were supporta-
ble. 4 Because the plaintiffs lawyers conceded that some of the claims
were listed by error, the court was convinced that the district court's
ruling should be affirmed and sanctions imposed.s5 If the plaintiff's
77. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
78. See id at 28.
79. See id. at 15.
80. See id. at 17.
81. See id. at 19-20.
82. Id- at 22.
83. See Rogers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit has been the most aggressive court of appeals in enforcing Rule
11. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp, 823 F2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987)(vacating a district court's order denying Rule 11 sanctions for filing a frivolous com-
plaint); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming a district court's impo-
sition of Rule 11 sanctions and adding a $1000 penalty for the delay caused by the
appeal).
84. See Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 638-39 (1987).
85. See Rogers, 771 F.2d at 205.
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lawyers had been more prepared, and more professional in presenting
the case, by persuasively arguing the applicability of the cited cases to
the claims asserted, the court would have lacked the basis to impose
sanctions. Thus, the plaintiff's lawyers were sanctioned because of
their unprofessional conduct rather than because the case lacked
merit.
A Sixth Circuit case, Albright v. Upjohn Co.,86 further demonstrates
how the courts would use Rule 11 to get at what they perceived to be
unprofessional conduct. The plaintiff's attorneys filed a products lia-
bility action, alleging that tetracycline-based drugs had caused the per-
manent staining and discoloration of the plaintiff's teeth.87 On the
same day, the same attorneys filed seven other actions against the
same nine companies.88 The plaintiff alleged that each of the defend-
ants were strictly liable to her, even though she did not know the
brand name or manufacturer of the particular drug she had used. 9
She alleged that one or more of the defendants had some connection
with the drugs she had used, that the nine manufacturers had engaged
in "conscious parallelism," and claimed that because she did not know
which of the defendants manufactured, sold and distributed the drugs
she used, the burden of proof was on each defendant to exculpate
itself by proving that its drug did not injure her.90
Records produced by the plaintiff during discovery directly con-
nected some of the defendants with the drugs the plaintiff used.91 It
was not possible to obtain the records of all the doctors who might
have prescribed tetracycline-based drugs for the plaintiff.' Upjohn
and four other defendants moved for summary judgment on the
ground that they had not been identified as manufacturers, distribu-
tors, or sellers of the drug that the plaintiff used.93 The court granted
the summary judgment motion.94 Upjohn then moved to amend its
judgment to include an award of attorney's fees under Rule 11.91 The
court denied the motion and Upjohn appealed.96
In a two-to-one decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed.97 Without dis-
cussing the arguments made by either party, the majority found that
plaintiff's attorney's pre-filing investigation "was insufficient because
it failed to disclose that the claim against Upjohn was 'well grounded
86. 788 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1986).
87. See id. at 1218-19.
88. See id. at 1221.
89. See id. at 1218-19.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1219.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 1219-20.
97. See id. at 1222.
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in fact' within the meaning of Rule 11 or that there existed any likeli-
hood that additional medical records would be located that could not
have been found through reasonable inquiry prior to filing."9 It
therefore found that the district court had abused its discretion in de-
nying the motion for sanctions.
Note, however, that the court ignored a possible enterprise liability
theory as a basis for joining Upjohn. Even if the relevant state's law
did not clearly support such a claim, arguably a good faith argument
for changing the law could have been made. Perhaps a better pre-
pared lawyer would have made the argument. Albright is thus an-
other example of a court allowing sanctions when it considered
conduct to be unprofessional.
2. The Widening Net for Unprofessional Conduct
As the three cases in the prior section demonstrate, the circuit
courts seized upon the new "reasonable inquiry" requirement as the
primary weapon in Rule 11 to curb unprofessional attorney conduct.
The following sections discuss examples of types of conduct that the
courts have found to be subject to Rule 11.
a. Affirmative Duty to Investigate
That Rule 11 was aimed at conduct is unquestionable. The 1983
Advisory Committee Note stated that the language of Rule 11
"stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and
the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule."" As the
Second Circuit put it, Rule 11 "explicitly and unambiguously imposes
an affirmative duty on each attorney to conduct a reasonable inquiry
into the viability of a pleading before it is signed."" The Third Cir-
cuit stated: "The rule imposes on counsel a duty to look before leap-
ing and may be seen as a litigation version of the familiar railroad
crossing admonition to 'stop, look, and listen."'"" 1 The Supreme
Court also recognized the affirmative duty Rule 11 places on those
who present papers to the court. The rule "imposes a duty on attor-
neys to certify that they have conducted a reasonable inquiry and have
determined that any papers filed with the court are well grounded in
fact, legally tenable, and 'not interposed for any improper pur-
pose."""2 Courts will not hesitate to find a Rule 11 violation if a rea-
98. Md at 1221.
99. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 1983 advisory committee's note. The 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 retain the reasonable inquiry requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
100. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985).
101. Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Childs v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 1018, 1024-26 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts warrants sanctions).
102. ooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990).
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sonable investigation is not made. 10 3 The duty to conduct a
reasonable investigation continues throughout the case. For example,
in Childs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 104 the court
found that the plaintiff's attorney had conducted a reasonable investi-
gation before filing an action against the insurance company on behalf
of his client who had been involved in a hit-and-run accident.10 5 Dur-
ing the course of discovery, the insurance company developed sub-
stantial evidence that the accident had been staged for the purpose of
collecting insurance money.1 0 6 The plaintiff's attorney failed to con-
duct any discovery of his own into the allegations of the insurance
company.10 7 The district court accordingly imposed a $30,000 sanction
against the attorney.' The Fifth Circuit affirmed:
We must agree that this inquiry was deficient. State Farm's evi-
dence of fraud was powerful, and yet, all of [the attorney's] investi-
gative efforts can be summed up as asking [his client] and his
alleged co-conspirators if they were frauds and reviewing the evi-
dence. Never did [the attorney] conduct any affirmative discovery
to test the verity of the evidence developed by State Farm. He
never conducted a single deposition. He never sent out any inter-
rogatories, requests for production or requests for admission.
Lastly, he never hired his own experts to support his client and to
refute the damaging reports by State Farm's experts. In light of the
compelling evidence of fraud in this case, [the attorney's] inquiry
cannot be said to be reasonable.' 0
9
Although the Fifth Circuit applied the 1983 version of Rule 11, its
analysis is consistent with the 1993 version. Liability in Childs at-
tached because the attorney continued to file papers in support of his
client's position. Under the "snap-shot" rule, ° it was these later filed
papers that triggered the Rule 11 liability, not the initial complaint.
The triggering event for Rule 11 liability was enlarged in the 1993
amendments to Rule 11. An attorney need not formally withdraw pa-
pers filed once it becomes apparent that the paper lacks a legal or
factual basis. However, an attorney may not continue to advocate the
103. See McGhee v. Sanilac County, 934 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir. 1991); White v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 687 (10th Cir. 1990); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1987).
104. 29 F.3d 1018 (5th Cir. 1984).
105. See id. at 1024.
106. See id. at 1025.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1028.
109. Id. at 1025 (footnote omitted).
110. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 5.04(b) (explaining the "snap-
shot" rule, pursuant to which, under the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, an attorney's
conduct would be judged as of the date on which he or she filed the paper). While the
1993 amendments did not directly overrule the "snap-shot" rule approach, they do
add a requirement that an attorney not "later advocate" the position taken in a paper
that later research shows has become frivolous. See id. § 1.08(e)(1)(B)(i).
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positions taken in the paper."' Rule 11(b) provides that later advo-
cating a position will trigger Rule 11 liability. 12 Thus, continuing to
press on with the case in the face of State Farm's evidence, either by
filing additional papers or by orally representing that he intended to
continue to pursue the case, triggered Rule 11.
Although some courts have held that the failure to engage in a rea-
sonable inquiry will result in sanctions only when the paper ultimately
filed is frivolous as well, 113 other courts take a strict conduct approach,
meaning that the failure to investigate, by itself, will result in sanc-
tions. In one sense, the first approach is sensible. There seems to be
no efficiency justification for permitting an adversary to question the
prefiling steps taken if the paper itself is colorable. On the other
hand, Rule 11 was designed to alter behavior. The point of the rule is
to impose an affirmative duty on attorneys. Under that view, it may
be appropriate to sanction an attorney correctly certifying that a pa-
per is well-grounded where the attorney lacked the knowledge or be-
lief that would have come from a reasonable inquiry. Imposing
sanctions when a paper is well-grounded, but when the attorney failed
to investigate, is an example of regulating the new professionalism
standard.
Consider the debate in the Third and Ninth Circuits engendered by
serial filings by different attorneys. In Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.," 4
the Third Circuit sanctioned lawyers who filed a complaint in a securi-
ties class action that was substantially the same as that previously filed
in another jurisdiction by another lavyer.115 The lawyers relied on the
pretrial investigation of the other attorney, whom they knew and had
worked with and whose investigation was held to comply with Rule
11, as the basis for complying with Rule 11.116 The Third Circuit
found that such reliance was inappropriate:
We recognize that it could be argued that it would have been point-
less for [the attorneys] to make an inquiry into the merits of the case
sufficient to satisfy Rule 11 as [the other attorney] already had done
so. Yet Rule 11 requires that an attorney signing a pleading must
make a reasonable inquiry personally. The advantage of duplicate
personal inquires is manifest: while one attorney might find a com-
plaint well founded in fact and warranted by the law, another, even
after examining the materials available to the first attorney, could
come to a contrary conclusion."'
111. See id § 1.08(e)(1)(B)(i).
112. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
113. See, eg., FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that
Rule 11 requires an investigation). The court noted, however, that sanctions should
be awarded "only when the failure to investigate leads to the taking of an objectively
unsupported position." Id.
114. 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).
115. See &L at 1283.
116. See id. at 1277.
117. Id. at 1280.
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One wonders, however, what this means in the context of Rule 1l's
objective test. Supposing the first attorney is reasonably competent, it
should follow that the suit has sufficient merit to be filed. If the pur-
pose of Rule 11 is to prevent nonmeritorious filings, the Garr decision
does nothing to achieve that result. It might, however, advance the
more substantive policy of avoiding the quick filing of securities class
actions. This goal was achieved substantively a year later when the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was passed.1"'
In contrast, in In re Keegan Management Securities Co.,' 9 a divided
panel reversed a $100,000 sanctions award imposed against the plain-
tiffs' attorneys.12 ° The district court had imposed sanctions under
Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power.121 The de-
fendant was a franchisee of a successful weight loss center that made
an initial public offering, with a subsequent rise in share value. 22
When controversy about the safety of the weight loss system used in
the center became the subject of Congressional hearings and articles
in the Wall Street Journal, the value of the defendant's stock fell ten
percent.123 Later that year, attorneys from two plaintiff securities
class action firms were consulted about filing law suits on the theory
that the defendant knew of, or recklessly failed to disclose, the health
risks the system posed, and accordingly, violated the securities laws.
Two class actions were filed early the next year.1 24
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence of scienter, and any known
link between the weight loss program and the health risks, to be "en-
tirely lacking." 125 The defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions, 26 but
withdrew the motion as part of settlement negotiations. 127 The parties
reached a settlement, but the district judge, sua sponte, issued an or-
der to show cause why Rule 11 sanctions should not be entered. 2
After a hearing, the court imposed a total of $100,000 in sanctions
against the two plaintiffs' attorneys and their respective firms pursu-
ant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C § 1927, and the court's inherent power.1'2 9
The court concluded that it was reckless for the attorneys to file the
118. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (Supp. I 1996).
119. 78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996).
120. See id. at 433.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. The 1983 version of Rule 11 was in effect at the time. Accordingly, it was
proper for the defendant to make a post-dismissal motion for sanctions, because the
"safe harbor" of the 1993 version was not yet in effect.
127. See Keegan, 78 F.3d at 433.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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class actions when they could "at best only guess that [the defendant]
recklessly failed to disclose health risks when issuing the IPO."'I
The Ninth Circuit reversed the sanctions award.1 31 By a two-to-one
majority, the court reversed the Rule 11 sanctions as well as the
§ 1927 and inherent power sanctions. The dissenting judge disagreed
with the majority on the disposition and analysis of the Rule 11 sanc-
tions issue but agreed that the § 1927 and inherent power sanctions
should be reversed. 32 An examination of the court's opinions details
the tensions manifested by the conduct/product aspects of Rule 11.
According to the majority, the district court erred because it fo-
cused only on what the plaintiffs' attorneys knew and did before they
filed the action.' 33 Additionally, it failed to consider after-acquired
evidence submitted by the plaintiffs' attorneys on the motion for sum-
mary judgment which the district court conceded adequately sup-
ported the allegations in the complaint."M That evidence was not
sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment, but did tend to
support the claims made in the complaint.'13 Indeed, the district court
noted that if the plaintiffs' attorneys had the information in their pos-
session before filing the complaint, Rule 11 would have been
satisfied. 36
The majority and the dissent sparred over the correct interpretation
and standard for applying Rule 11. Specifically, they disagreed over
how objective the inquiry about an attorney's conduct should be. The
majority opted for a purely objective analysis which would excuse a
failure to engage in a reasonable investigation-the "product ap-
proach"-if the resulting filing is objectively reasonable.'37 The dis-
sent would not excuse a failure to investigate, taking the "conduct
approach."'18
On the merits of the disagreement, any construction of Rule 11 that
limits satellite litigation should be preferable to one that may not. Ar-
guably, there is no systemic harm if the attorney's guess proves to be
correct. The legal system is not burdened in such a case. If a hunch
proves to be wrong, the "product" may well be deemed frivolous, and
sanctions may be in order. In other words, attorneys who file plead-
ings without engaging in a reasonable inquiry run the risk that their
"guess" or "hunch" that there has been wrongdoing will result in sanc-
tions. Obviously, all attorneys would be well-served by complying
with the reasonable inquiry requirement, rather than simply going
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id at 437.
133. See id. at 434-35.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 434.
138. See id at 437.
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with their hunches. Knowing the risks entailed when one guesses
wrong should be a sufficient incentive to comply with the rule's af-
firmative duty to investigate. On the other hand, the enforcement
principle suggests that Rule 11 is a more effective deterrent to unpro-
fessional conduct when an attorney that has failed to comply with its
dictates is sanctioned, even when the attorney has guessed correctly.
b. Inexperienced, Busy, or Sole Practitioners
A variation on this theme is presented by the case of inexperienced,
busy, or sole practitioners. The enforcement principle has been
worked hard in cases where attorneys seek to defend or justify an in-
adequate prefiling inquiry on the grounds that they are sole practi-
tioners, or, for whatever reason, they lack sufficient resources and
time to prepare to the extent required by Rule 11. While many courts
are sensitive to the impact a lack of resources may have on an attor-
ney's ability to conduct a thorough prefiling investigation, such de-
fenses generally fall on deaf ears. In re TCI Ltd., 39 despite its lengthy
set of facts, provides a textbook example of this Rule 11 problem.
TCI operated a restaurant in a building leased from a company,
Marathon, and bought fixtures and furnishings for the restaurant, with
proceeds from a bank loan that was secured by the lease. The loan
was guaranteed by two individuals.14 ° When TCI fell behind in its
rental payments, Marathon obtained an eviction order from a state
court. Before TCI could be evicted, it filed for bankruptcy, apparently
to take advantage of the automatic stay provision that freezes the rela-
tionship among the debtor and its creditors. Marathon and the bank
successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court for relief from the stay.", I
The order required the trustee to abandon all right to the leasehold
and the bank agreed not to pursue the guarantors for ninety days.
The practical effect of the order was to terminate TCI's lease and
leave it to Marathon and the bank to work out any rights that the
bank may have retained. Marathon then sold the property. 4 '
In one of TCI's filings to the bankruptcy court, it stipulated that
Marathon had a claim of $56,108.35 against TCI, apparently for back
rent. 143 Three weeks later, the same attorney who had stipulated to
the claim, filed a proceeding against Marathon and the bank on behalf
of TCI and the individuals who had guaranteed the loan, alleging in
essence that Marathon had been ordered by the court to give notice to
them before the sale, and that the plaintiffs still owned the fixtures.14'4
139. 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985).
140. See id. at 442.
141. See id. at 443.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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The district court dismissed the amended complaint and a second
amended complaint for failure to state a claim, because the bank-
ruptcy court order contained no obligation on Marathon with respect
to the sale of the property and because the only way to have the bank-
ruptcy court's order set aside would be to allege fraud, which was not
alleged.145 The court found that the attorney was under intense pres-
sure from the individual clients to make sure that the sale be undone
and that no action be taken against the guarantors. Nevertheless, the
district court awarded sanctions under Rule 11 because there was no
"effort to ascertain whether it had a basis in law." 46 Although the
first complaint was frivolous, the court stated that "[t]he initial at-
tempt may well be deemed creative. Subsequent efforts to plead the
case, however, lacked the real or imagined urgency which may have
justified [the attorney's] first effort .... Creativity does not demon-
strate itself in slight variations on a theory previously and emphati-
cally rejected."" 47
The plaintiffs had two main arguments for avoiding sanctions: first,
the attorney had to file the complaints to keep the business of the
clients and, second, what the attorney did was standard bankruptcy
practice in Chicago."4 The unanimous Seventh Circuit panel opinion,
written by Judge Easterbrook, rejected those arguments.14 9 With re-
spect to the first argument, the court said that while the desire to keep
clients is an inevitable part of legal practice, attorneys "must under-
stand that their adversary's fees become a cost of their business."' 0
Judge Easterbrook rejected the second argument that because bank-
ruptcy work is a high-volume, low-margin practice, it is excusable for
attorneys to file pleadings before doing research. While agreeing that
not all pleadings need to be handcrafted, and that $2000 of research is
not required in a $200 case, he wrote:
The premise of routinized legal service, however, is precisely the
routine nature of the claims. A lawyer may handle a large number
of cases quickly by applying standard legal principles to each one.
This does not support a complaint that proffers a new theory-not
only in the sense that there is no precedent but also in the sense that
it cuts against much precedent. Such a complaint is not a routine
part of a busy practice. Rule 11 now requires a lawyer to undertake
research before filing such a complaint .... An attorney who wants
to strike off on a new path in the law must make an effort to deter-
145. See id. at 444.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting In re Chronopoulos, 36 B.R. 364, 367 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1984)).
148. See id. at 446-47.
149. The decision was actually based on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because amended Rule 11
was not in effect at the time the pleadings were filed. The court made clear, however,
that its reasoning was supported by Rule 11. See id. at 44647.
150. Id at 446 (citing Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 102 (7th Cir. 1985) (imposing$2500 damages for yielding to client's demand)).
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mine the nature of the principles he is applying (or challenging); he
may not impose the expense of doing this on his adversaries-who
are likely to be just as busy and will not be amused by a claim that
the rigors of daily practice excuse legal research.151
While the Seventh Circuit's opinion provides some guidelines, it
does not suggest what an attorney in a busy, routinized practice
should do, especially in the face of a nearing statute of limitations
deadline, when a non-routine matter walks through the door. Is the
attorney to always refer the matter to a more specialized, high-pow-
ered law firm that is better equipped to do the necessary research?
What if the clients cannot afford such a firm, which is why they went
to the legal clinic or other high-volume legal services office? Who
pays if the high-priced law firm decides there is no claim or that there
is a claim, but the research costs as much as the claim is worth? In
other words, how much leeway does an attorney have to fly by the
seat of his pants when he has a sense that the claim is a good one?
Nonetheless, TCI and later cases make clear that a minimum stan-
dard applies to all attorneys, including those who are not experienced
federal practitioners, such as the plaintiff's lawyer in Hays v. Sony
Corp. of America.15 In that case, a small-city practitioner with appar-
ently little federal court experience, and even less experience in copy-
right law, filed an action on behalf of certain school teachers. 153 The
teachers had prepared a word processing manual on how to operate
DEC computers for their employer. The school then bought word
processors from Sony, and gave the plaintiffs' manual to Sony to mod-
ify it for use with Sony word processors.1 54 The plaintiffs believed that
the defendant had co-opted their manual. They first registered their
manual with the Copyright Office, then filed a federal action alleging
common law and federal copyright causes of action.1 55 They also al-
leged that Sony "'made large profits by reason of appropriating to its
own use Plaintiffs' workbook."156
The district court dismissed the claims, and granted the defendant's
motion for sanctions. However, the court awarded $14,895.46, instead
of the full fee request of $47,000, against the plaintiffs' attorney, but
not the plaintiffs. A motion to vacate the award was denied Septem-
ber 8, 1987.157
Looking to the attorney's conduct, the circuit court pointed out that
he was a "solo practitioner in [a] town of... 14,000" people and that
151. Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
152. 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988).
153. See id. at 413.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Id. (quoting the Complaint).
157. See id.
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he was not a specialist in federal practice or copyright law. 5 The
court said further:
[The attorney] is not to be criticized for having failed to acquire
expertness in an esoteric field of federal law and the niceties of fed-
eral procedure. But the Rule 11 standard, like the negligence stan-
dard in tort law, is an objective standard, as we have said. It makes
no allowance for the particular circumstances of particular
practitioners. 5
9
The court went on to complete its analogy to legal malpractice:
"There is no 'locality rule' in legal malpractice ... and while a legal
specialist may be held to an even higher standard of care than a gener-
alst... the generalist acts at his peril if he brings a suit in a field or
forum with which he is unacquainted."' 6 Because the attorney failed
to heed that precept, sanctions were imposed.
Similarly, another panel of the Seventh Circuit stated: "We are not
insensitive to the realities of practice, and we recognize that persons
practicing law by themselves or in small firms may not have instant
access to the latest court decisions." '161 Thus, it excused the plaintiffs
attorney for not knowing about a two-month-old controlling decision
at the time she filed the complaint, but sanctioned her for filing an
amended complaint four months later and almost six months after the
decision. 62
Under the 1993 version of Rule 11, as with the 1983 version, litigat-
ing cases in federal court that are beyond one's expertise may result in
sanctions. In Anderson v. County of Montgomery,163 plaintiff was con-
victed of a misdemeanor, then brought civil rights claims against de-
fendants who allegedly violated his rights in connection with the
158. Id at 418.
159. Id- at 418-19 (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
161. Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1992); see also
Johnson v. Tower Air, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 461, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (expressing sympa-
thy for the plight of a solo practitioner, but imposing sanctions because the attorney
pursued meritless claims).
162. See Rush, 966 F.2d at 1123. But see Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army,
914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit reversed sanctions imposed by the
district court on a junior associate who had become "primary trial counsel" after a
massive Title VII discrimination case had suffered some serious blows. See id. at 546.
The court rejected the district court's narrow view of its authority and its failure to
consider a broad range of factors. See id. It stressed the extraordinary circumstances
confronting the junior associate. She was only 18 months out of law school, and only
six months out of her clerkship, when she was assigned to the massive case. Only one
month of discovery remained in the case at the time. A year and a half later, the
senior partner in the case left the law firm, and the associate was put in charge and, at
times, litigated the case virtually alone against an eleven person defense team. See id.
Moreover, the court pointed out that the problem with the case was that it was not
properly investigated and should not have been brought in the first place. To permit
sanctions against a person who came on the scene years after the case was filed was
inappropriate. See id. at 550.
163. 111 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1997).
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undisturbed conviction. 164 His lawyer was sanctioned because he
failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the claims. The fail-
ure was especially egregious because of the serious nature of the as-
sertions of wrongdoing made, which should have prompted a more
thorough pre-filing investigation.165 The attorney admitted that he
was "in over his head" in federal court, and promised not to litigate
cases there again. While the matter was pending, however, the district
court learned that the attorney had taken on another complex federal
case. The district court sanctioned the attorney $9,681.95.166
These cases take a quite expansive view as to the type of conduct
subject to Rule 11. The language in these decisions sends a message
to attorneys unfamiliar with federal practice to engage in extra investi-
gation than they might otherwise think appropriate, consult a more
experienced federal practitioner, or keep out. "A lawyer who lacks
relevant expertise must either associate with him a lawyer who has it,
or must bone up on the relevant law at every step in the way in recog-
nition that his lack of experience makes him prone to error."'167 At-
torneys will not escape sanctions on the theory that they are
unfamiliar with the law of the jurisdiction in which papers are filed.168
164. See id. at 499.
165. See id. at 501.
166. See id. at 498. The attorney offered several excuses by way of mitigation of the
amount of the sanctions. The court of appeals rejected the attorney's inability to pay
argument because the attorney had told the district court that he could afford to pay
and that the amount was reasonable. At the oral argument on the sanctions motion in
the district court, the attorney made an argument that one might want to avoid mak-
ing in future cases:
And I purposely did not bring [my inability to pay] to the Court's attention
because the truth of the matter is I sought big bucks against these people, I
sought punitive damages. And for me to be a wimp and say, oh my God, I
can't pay it, that's not right. But so you don't jam me for contempt of court,
and I realize I have to provide detailed financial statements; I have negative
net worth. But if it is the last thing I ever do, I will pay these people off. If
it's not reversed on appeal, I swear to God I will pay them off, because some
things are just not morally right.
Id. at 502.
167. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omit-
ted); see also Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that "[ilnexperienced or incompetent attorneys are not held to a lesser stan-
dard under Rule 11" (citation and footnote omitted)); Gibson v. City of Alexandria,
855 F. Supp. 133, 137 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that inexperience is no excuse for sanc-
tionable conduct and further noting that the state's ethical rules require an attorney to
be competent in an area or to associate with competent co-counsel).
168. See Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie v. Life Assurance Co., 128 F.R.D. 233, 237
(N.D. Ill. 1989); cf Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir.
1988) (refusing to sustain a claim that would not have been made had the attorney
made a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case). But see Landin v. E. Daskal
Corp., 136 F.R.D. 363, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying a motion for Rule 11 sanctions
despite the fact that the errors made were due to counsel's lack of familiarity with
federal practice and ordering counsel to become familiar with federal practice and
local rules for all future proceedings).
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Exercising poor judgment, or performing work carelessly may also re-
sult in sanctions. 69
While consulting with another attorney may prevent some Rule 11
problems, it may add considerably, sometimes unnecessarily, to the
costs of litigation. On the other hand, courts, and the adversaries of
inexperienced attorneys or attorneys with limited resources, may
rightly be concerned about the extra trouble and expenses these attor-
neys may create. The Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 11,
however, makes clear that courts should determine whether the attor-
ney acted reasonably under the circumstances. Certainly, inexperi-
ence and lack of resources are part of these circumstances, and
arguably should serve as mitigating factors with respect to both
whether there has been a Rule 11 violation and what an appropriate
sanction should be. 7 They rarely, however, form the basis for a com-
plete defense, and instead, the enforcement principle usually results in
a finding of a Rule 11 violation.
c. Miscellaneous Conduct
Over the past few years, the courts have discussed a number of
types of routine, arguably unprofessional, practices, and imposed
sanctions in many instances where they occurred. A number of these
cases illustrate classic lawyer mistakes that now may result in sanc-
tions that would not have come to the attention of disciplinary author-
ities before the advent of Rule 11.
i. Use of Form Complaints
In Terran v. Kaplan,7' the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. 172 The plaintiff's attorney had used a
form complaint, and the court concluded that the attorney had not
engaged in a reasonable prefiling investigation into many of the claims
alleged.' 73
ii. Failure to Read Statute or the Omission of Words
in Quotations
In In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 174 at oral argument, an
attorney admitted that he had not read the entire statute that he had
relied upon to assert his position in connection with a bankruptcy pro-
169. See Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d
41, 47 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's decision not to impose sanctions de-
spite attorney's poor judgment and work performance).
170. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, §§ 6.02(e), 9.03(a)(3)(D).
171. 109 F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997).
172. See id at 1434-35.
173. See id. at 1435.
174. 87 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 1996).
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ceeding. 175 The court was also concerned that when quoting from the
statute, the attorney had omitted certain words:
These admissions negate any claim that he formed a belief after rea-
sonable inquiry that his reliance on [the statute] was well grounded
in fact or warranted by existing law. The first and most fundamen-
tal step in making the required inquiry must be to know what a
statute relied upon actually says. This is particularly true when the
reference to the statute in the signed paper shows on its face that
words have been omitted. Recognizing that any omission has the
potential to change the meaning of quoted material, a careful attor-
ney will read the statute in its entirety to be certain that the omis-
sions have not had that effect. 176
iii. Reliance on Conclusory Statements of Client
In Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 77 the plaintiff's attorney
was sanctioned $25,000 for filing a frivolous complaint without making
a reasonable investigation. 178 The attorney had not performed an in-
dependent investigation with respect to the factual basis for the essen-
tial element of damages in a state law action for tortious interference
with a business relationship. 179 Rather, the attorney simply relied on
the conclusory statements of his long-time client that the client had
suffered injury.' ° In fact, had the attorney checked further, he would
have learned that the letters the client claimed harmed his ability to
deal with third parties did not affect those third parties' decision as to
whether to deal with the plaintiff. 8' This case reminds us that
although courts generally permit an attorney to rely on clients' state-
ments, particularly when there is little time to conduct an independent
investigation, to avoid sanctions, attorneys ought to check all relevant
documents at the client's disposal, question the client closely about
the facts pertinent to all aspects of the claim, and at least try to inter-
view third parties with relevant information before filing a pleading.'
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11 have worked a subtle, but impor-
tant change in the certification as to facts. Hadges v. Yonkers Racing
Corp., 83 involved the question of whether an attorney is allowed to
175. See id. at 1151.
176. Id. at 1151.
177. 87 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1996).
178. See id. at 1254-55.
179. See id. at 1254.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Cf. Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784-85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing a
district court's refusal to sanction where an "attorney acted unreasonably in giving
blind deference to his client and assuming his client had knowledge not disclosed to
the attorney"); Watson v. City of Salem, 934 F. Supp. 643, 666 (D.N.J. 1995) (impos-
ing sanctions for failure to make a reasonable investigation in an employment dis-
crimination case).
183. 48 F.3d 1320 (2d Cir. 1995).
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rely on the objectively reasonable statements of his or her client." In
answering the question in the affirmative, the court stated: "No
longer are attorneys required to certify that their representations are
'well-grounded in fact.' The current version of the Rule requires only
that an attorney conduct 'an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances' into whether 'factual contentions have evidentiary
support."185
Thus, the certification has less to do with whether the facts them-
selves are true. Rather, it has to do with whether there is objectively
reasonable evidence from which an attorney could suggest that a trier
of fact could find that the facts are true.
iv. Reliance on Private Investigators
The Ninth Circuit, in a two-to-one decision, has taken a harsh look
at attorneys' reliance on private investigators. In Security Farms v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chatffers, Warehousemen &
Helpers,186 the plaintiff-employers filed suit against various unions al-
leging illegal strike and picketing activity."s The plaintiffs filed suit
largely on the strength of "smoking gun" declarations from workers
who claimed knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing. 1' Subsequently,
the district court determined that the private investigator who had ob-
tained the declarations for the plaintiffs was not licensed and that he
and the declarants lacked credibility.8 9 The majority criticized the
plaintiffs for "accept[ing] at face value Vidal's representation that he
held a private investigator's license and was fluent in both English and
Spanish," rather than conducting an inquiry into the investigator's
background. 9 ' The majority rejected the plaintiffs' counsel's attempt
to shift blame to Vidal, agreeing with the district court that "by blindly
relying on Vidal under these circumstances, counsel violated its duty
to conduct a reasonable inquiry."'19 1
Judge Kleinfeld dissented, concluding that the plaintiffs' attorneys
were not relying on a "pure heart and empty head" defense.' g9
Rather, they were not required to investigate further because they had
good reason to think that the declarations were genuine and true
when filed: "A lawyer should not have to investigate independent in-
vestigators he hires and witnesses whose plausible affidavits he files,
184. See id at 1329-30.
185. Id at 1330 (citations omitted).
186. 124 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997).
187. See id at 1004-06.
188. See id at 1016.
189. See id at 1016 n.23.
190. Id
191. Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
192. Id.
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or else be in jeopardy of Rule 11 sanctions if opposing counsel attacks
them. 1
93
v. Reliance on Forwarding Counsel
Another case involving a securities class action raised a common
problem: the extent to which a lead attorney may rely on the asser-
tions of forwarding counsel. In In re Frontier Insurance Group,
Inc.,'1 94 a consolidated class action complaint was filed. 195 Co-lead
counsel named as a plaintiff an individual who was represented by
other attorneys. 196 Co-lead counsel believed that they were author-
ized to name him, based on their conversations with the other attor-
neys. 197 Later, the plaintiff indicated that he had not authorized the
filing of the suit by any attorney on his behalf. 198 The defendants
sought to defeat class certification by arguing, among other things,
that this episode revealed that the person named by co-lead counsel
was not an adequate representative of the class. 199 The court rejected
the argument, finding that "[a]bsent any reasonable indication of a
problem, an attorney may legitimately rely on the representation by
another attorney that he or she is authorized to act on behalf of a
client."2 ' The court suggested, however, that the other counsel may
have violated Rule 11: "[E]ven though [the other counsel] may be
held responsible for their failure adequately to verify their authoriza-
tion to represent Bernstein, co-lead counsel are not rendered inade-
quate class counsel by virtue of their reliance on [the other counsel's]
assurances that they were so authorized." ''
3. Rule 11 and Fee Shifting
Early circuit court cases created a strong incentive for private en-
forcement of Rule 11 by making it a powerful fee-shifting device.
Although the 1983 Advisory Committee Note suggested that the
amended rule was designed to deter abusive litigation behavior,02 a
Federal Judicial Center Study found several purposes to be served by
the rule: "to penalize the violator, to compensate the offended party,
and to deter others from engaging in similarly abusive conduct. 20 3
Confusion over which one of these purposes is the primary purpose
led to inconsistent results in the cases. For example, the Federal Judi-
193. Id.
194. 172 F.R.D. 31 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
195. See id. at 34-35.
196. See id. at 37.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 40.
200. Id. at 45.
201. Id.
202. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 198.
203. Kassin, supra note 6, at 29.
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cial Center's study demonstrated that "compensation-oriented judges
were more likely to impose sanctions than were those who were either
punishment or deterrence oriented."2  More importantly for our
purposes, however, apart from concerns about the purpose of the rule,
as a practical matter, the courts settled on the use of compensatory
sanctions as the primary sanction.
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to expressly con-
front this issue. In In re Yagmnan,20 5 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
"primary purpose" of Rule 11 is to "deter subsequent abuses" in that
litigation.20 6 Thus, the rule was designed to achieve a specific deter-
rent effect. Accordingly, the district court judge should monitor the
attorneys closely and tell them that their conduct is sanctionable at the
time the offending conduct occurs.20 7 Because the district court judge
in Yagman had tolerated abuses during the course of the litigation
without warning the attorney that his conduct was sanctionable, the
attorney could not be subjected to a compensatory $250,000 sanc-
tion.2"8 Finding a Rule 11 violation at the end of the litigation and
imposing the sanction would not achieve the specific deterrent effect
articulated by the court.20 9
The effect of focusing on the purpose of Rule 11 was clear. Argua-
bly, because the opposing counsel claimed that the attorney's sanc-
tionable conduct resulted in $293,000 in attorney's fees and costs, the
$250,000 sanction would have been appropriate if the primary purpose
of the rule was to compensate the aggrieved side. Similarly, the "mas-
sive, post-trial retribution" may have served a punitive or general de-
terrent effect as well.2 10 Despite the result in Yagman, and although
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 made clear that the purpose of Rule
11 is purely deterrence,2 ' there continues to be broad support among
the bench and bar for Rule 11 to incorporate a compensatory as well
as deterrent purpose.2 12
204. Id
205. 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986).
206. Id at 1183; see also Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Lea, 979 F.2d 377, 379 (5th
Cir. 1992) (stating that the "basic policies of 'deterrence and education' [are] behind
Rule 11"); White v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 502 (10th Cir. 1992) (assert-
ing that the primary purpose of Rule 11 "should be deterring future violations" (cita-
tion omitted)).
207. See Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1183-84.
208. See id. at 1183-88.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1185. The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the case be randomly reas-
signed on remand. Id at 1188. When the district court judge refused, the sanctioned
attorney filed a petition for mandamus, which was granted. See Brown v. Baden, 815
F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1987).
211. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.04(b).
212. See FJC 1995 Report, supra note 6, at 5-6 (noting that 66% of judges, 43% of
plaintiffs' attorneys, and 63% of defendants' attorneys believe the purpose of a Rule
11 sanction should include compensation as well as deterrence).
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Focusing on the purpose of Rule 11 became particularly important
as the rule became used as a fee-shifting device. This, in turn, en-
couraged a counterproductive increase in Rule 11 motions. Indeed,
Judge Weis, who was on the Advisory Committee at the time the 1983
version of Rule 11 was adopted, lamented that Rule 11 had become
the subject of abuse. "Because the issues in this case are close, we
consider the ... invocation of Rule 11 to border on the abusive. We
caution litigants that Rule 11 is not to be used routinely ....
Thus, the judicial response to the Rule's standards contributed
largely to the dramatic growth of Rule 11 activity. Ninety-six per-
cent 214 of the cases in which monetary sanctions including attorneys'
fees were awarded implicitly endorsed the 1983 Advisory Commit-
tee's plan to provide the financial incentive necessary for attorneys to
challenge adversaries for falling below Rule 11 standards.215 The
prospect of fee-shifting, in turn, was primarily responsible for the ex-
plosion of Rule 11 litigation. However, the 1993 amendments are
designed to deemphasize fee-based sanctions,21 6 and have occassioned
a shift to the use of non-monetary sanctions.217 Nonetheless, the fee-
shifting led to excessive satellite litigation, especially against plaintiffs'
attorneys and in civil rights actions, and caused wide segments of the
bar to take note of Rule 11's proscriptions.18
III. How LAWYERS REACTED TO RULE 11
As this part will show, Rule 11 has had a significant impact on attor-
neys. These effects, however, have been both positive and negative.
This part will first discuss whether the rule had its intended effect of
improving lawyer conduct. Then, it will review the evidence that the
rule has had a negative impact on lawyer conduct. In summary, there
is substantial evidence that Rule 11 caused the intended effect of im-
213. Morristown Daily Record, Inc. v. Graphic Communications Union, Local 8N,
832 F.2d 31, 32 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Waltz v. County of Lycoming, 974 F.2d 387,
390 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that a "Rule 11 violation should [not] automatically result
in an award of counsel fees and costs .... [T]he prime goal should be deterrence of
repetition of improper conduct").
214. Cf Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo.
L.J. 1313, 1333 (1986) (concluding that in 96% of cases in which sanctions were im-
posed monetary awards were employed). The FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 1B,
at 9, confirms that attorney's fees were the sanction of choice. The percentage of
rulings imposing a sanction of attorney's fees were 80%, 86%, 90%, 93%, and 70% in
the five districts surveyed. See also AJS Study, supra note 6, at 956-57 (reporting simi-
lar findings, but noting that the amount of the sanction was generally small).
215. See supra Part I.
216. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 1.08(e)(1)(C)(v).
217. See infra Part IV.
218. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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proving some litigation practices.219 There is no doubt that the wide-
spread publicity about the rule led to a greater sense of awareness by
more attorneys of their professional obligations under the rule. De-
spite some evidence to the contrary,"-2"° however, excessive satellite lit-
igation undermined the goal of improving lawyer conduct as a means
for streamlining litigation. Moreover, Rule 11 may have contributed
to the professionalism problem as contentious sanctions practice con-
tributed to a decrease in attorney civility.
There have been other effects of Rule 11, such as its disproportion-
ate impact on plaintiffs, its chilling effect, and its possible overuse in
civil rights cases, all of which have been discussed extensively in other
articles and studies, and which have led to the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11.221 They will not be reviewed extensively here, except to the
extent that they are directly related to how lawyers have changed their
actual conduct and practice in response to Rule 11.
1. The Good News
a. Rule 11 Caused Attorneys to Stop and Think
Rule 11 requires an attorney to engage in a reasonable inquiry into
the legal and factual bases for the legal positions and allegations to be
asserted. Quite clearly, the 1983 Advisory Committee intended the
amendments to Rule 11 to effect a behavioral change, i.e., to en-
courage lawyers to "stop and think" before filing pleadings and mo-
tions.222 The question was whether lawyers would change their
conduct in response to amended Rule 11. The answer, quite plainly, is
that lawyers engaged in significantly more prefiling research than they
had before Rule 11 was amended in 1983. Every empirical study con-
firms the finding. For example, a study conducted for the American
Judicature Society ("AJS study") showed that almost 40% of lawyers
in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had increased their pre-filing
investigations in response to Rule 1 1,r2 and a Third Circuit Study re-
ported an over 43% increase in prefiling investigation.224 Further,
22.9% of the respondents in the AJS study indicated that the biggest
impact of Rule 11 was to increase their factual investigation. ' An-
other 5.4% reported that Rule 11's biggest impact was to increase
time spent on legal research." 6 Although the AJS Study indicated
219. See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 174-75; Burbank, Third Circuit Report,
supra note 6, at 75-77. The Third Circuit Task Force study was limited to cases within
the Third Circuit.
220. See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 112, 168; Burbank, Third Circuit Report,
supra note 6, at 84-85.
221. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, §§ 2.01-2.04, at 2.4 to -69.
222. See 1983 Amendments, supra note 17, at 198-99.
223. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 964.
224. See Burbank, Third Circuit Report, supra note 6, at 75-76.
225. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 964.
226. See id.
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that in most cases the extra effort was relatively small,227 and that the
median sanction was relatively modest ($2500),228 the impact of Rule
11 is nevertheless dramatic.
Interestingly, the latest and most comprehensive study of lawyer
conduct in response to Rule 11 showed that every segment of the
bar-lawyers from small and larger firms and entities,229 and from the
plaintiffs' or defendants' barsa°-engaged in greater prefiling inquiry
because of the threat of Rule 11 sanctions. Moreover, and not surpris-
ingly, lawyers who had had some experience with Rule 11 themselves
conducted an even more thorough investigation."3 Overall, the AJS
study revealed that over 60% of the lawyers surveyed took some ac-
tion-either greater prefiling investigation, refusing to file a pleading,
or other action-because of the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.232
In some respects, as has been discussed by others, these are curious
findings.233 If over 40% of lawyers increased their pre-filing investiga-
tion, there may have been a lot of lawyers acting unprofessionally
before the 1983 amendments, which in turn confirms that existing dis-
ciplinary mechanisms for enforcing professional standards were not
working. The responding lawyers, however, were asked about their
extra effort in the context that suggests that they would not otherwise
have acted unprofessionally:
Over and above what normal good lawyering would require in the
absence of the provision for sanctions under Rule 11, how many
extra hours did you and others in your firm spend on this case...
out of concern that a Rule 11 challenge, justified or unjustified,
might be brought against you? 2 3 4
Thus, at least at face value, the lawyers were reporting doing extra
work, beyond that expected by a good professional. If only attorneys
who were acting professionally in the first place altered their behavior,
Rule 11 has not improved the conduct of those behaving unprofes-
sionally. It is unlikely, however, that the attorneys would have admit-
ted to acting unprofessionally before Rule 11 was amended. In that
sense, Rule 11 has raised the level of attorney conduct. Moreover, the
AJS study showed that the response to Rule 11 was across-the-board.
227. See id. at 958-59.
228. See id. at 957.
229. See id. at 975-77.
230. See id. at 985. Although the study did indicate that plaintiffs' lawyers who are
engaged in civil rights work increased their prefiling inquiries to an even larger de-
gree. See id.
231. See id. at 980-81.
232. See id. at 961.
233. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 65, 82-84 (1996) (discussing the
impact of Rule 11 sanctions on pre-filing investigations).
234. AJS Study, supra note 6, at 959.
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Lawyers in big cities and small towns,2 5 working in large firms and
small settings,236 representing plaintiffs and defendants,2 7 in all types
of litigation reported similar behavioral changes in response to the
threat of sanctions,z 8 even when the type of practice presented rela-
tively little risk of sanctions." 9 Thus, it is likely that the rule did in-
deed raise the level of lawyering across a broad spectrum of practice.
b. Is Rule 11 Deterring Meritless Claims?
Another measure of the positive impact of Rule 11 is the extent to
which Rule 11 has deterred meritless claims. Professor Nelken's study
of the Northern District of California revealed that Rule 11 has re-
sulted in decreased filings of boilerplate defenses and counterclaims,
and that it has discouraged "questionable cases." 240 Firms established
policies or guidelines regarding whether papers may be filed and
whether Rule 11 motions should be made.241 The AJS study con-
firmed Professor Nelken's results. Nineteen percent of those sur-
veyed reported declining marginal cases, 28.8% relied on Rule 11 to
discourage a client from pursuing or defending a case, and 24.5% ad-
vised clients not to pursue a questionable case.242
Whether Rule 11 is the best deterrent to improper filings, however,
is open to question. The 1991 Federal Judicial Center Preliminary Re-
port revealed some surprises. While over 80% of the judicial respon-
dents indicated that they believed Rule 11 should be retained in its
1983 form,243 three-quarters of the responding judges thought ground-
less litigation was only a small problem.24 Moreover, only a few
judges thought Rule 11 was "very effective" in deterring groundless
pleadings.245 The judges indicated that other methods, such as prompt
rulings on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, were effective
for regulating groundless litigation. Rule 16 status conferences and
warnings were also viewed as much more effective than sanctions
under Rule 11 or other devices.246
235. See id. at 976.
236. See id at 977 tbl.16.
237. See id. at 963 tbl.7.
238. See id. at 985.
239. See generally id at 965-75 (discussing the effect of Rule 11 sanctions on differ-
ent practice areas).
240. Nelken, supra note 6, at 149-50 (quoting lawyer surveyed).
241. See id. at 150.
242. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 961.
243. See FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 2A. The FJC did not ask the judges to
evaluate specific proposals for amending Rule 11. Rather it asked judges to choose
between the current rule, the pre-1983 version of the rule, or an amended version of
the rule. Only 7% believed the rule should be returned to its pre-1983 language.
However, 12.5% thought the rule should be amended in some way. See id.
244. See id. § 2A, at 2.
245. Id. § 2A, at 2, 5.
246. See id § 2A, at 16-17.
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, a great deal of anecdotal evidence exists that a
large number of judges, including those who previously were less zeal-
ous in prodding the parties before them, cite Rule 11 in pretrial con-
ferences and other proceedings on and off the record to remind
litigants of their obligations under Rule 11, and that monetary conse-
quences could follow violations of the rule.247 One district judge, re-
sponding to the Federal Judicial Center's Rule 11 Judge Survey, noted
the in terrorem effect of the rule: "I think the existence of Rule 11,
not its use, has helped. 2 48
Under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, courts still have the power
to impose sanctions sua sponte,2 4 9 and may impose fines as a sanc-
tion.2 50 Accordingly, courts continue to invoke Rule 11 at status con-
ferences and the like.25' Moreover, the Federal Judicial Center's
("FJC") latest study of Rule 11 strongly suggests that a solid majority
of judges and lawyers are opposed to amending Rule 11 yet again to
restore it to its 1983, or pre-1983, form.2 12 The FJC's survey indicated
that most judges and lawyers believe that the problem of groundless
litigation in federal courts either never existed or is the same or
smaller than it was before 1993.
247. Representative of this approach is the warning contained in Brown v. Federa-
tion of State Medical Boards, No. 82 C 7398, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11795, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 10, 1983) ("Without expressing any view as to the merits of the case, the
court admonished each side as to the possible sanctions which can be imposed pursu-
ant to Amended Rule 11 ... in the event either side would assert any position which is
not well grounded in fact."). See also J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,909
F.2d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of complaint, but granting leave to
replead, warning: "In allowing an amendment, we remind the plaintiffs that they
must make new, good faith factual allegations, pleading a new theory of liability other
than the one rejected here"); Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 861 F.
Supp. 1252, 1260 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (cautioning counsel "to undertake their duties
under Rule 11 more responsibly in the future"), affd, 57 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 1995); St.
Jarre v. Heidelberger Druckmaschinen A.G., 816 F. Supp. 424, 427 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(denying motion for Rule 11 sanctions while admonishing counsel that the filing of
baseless pleadings will in the future result in Rule 11 sanctions), affd, 19 F.3d 1430
(4th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Westside-Urban Health Ctr., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1575, 1582
(S.D. Ga. 1991) (same).
248. FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 2A, at 20.
249. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 1.08(e)(1)(C)(ii). Courts, how-
ever, must issue an order to show cause, which should detail the sanctionable conduct
and state why sanctions should not be imposed. See id.
250. See id. § 1.08(e)(1)(C)(v). Courts no longer may impose attorney's fees as a
sanction sua sponte. See id.
251. See, e.g., Moeller v. D'Arrigo, 163 F.R.D. 489, 494 (E.D. Va. 1995) (directing
plaintiff's attention to Rule 11, and warning plaintiff not to file other submissions
without factual and legal support); Salman v. Department of 'fTreasury-IRS, 899 F.
Supp. 473, 474 (D. Nev. 1995) ("This lawsuit was nothing more than naked harass-
ment, and Salman is now warned: Should he file another like it against the I.R.S. in
the future, he will defend against not only a vexatious litigant order but severe mone-
tary sanctions under Rule 11 ... as well.").
252. FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 2A, at 19.
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Judicial resolve to enforce Rule 11 is typified by the warning in
Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co. v. International Association of Ma-
chinists: "Lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit, take heed!" 3
On a "kindler, gentler" note, a major Federal Judicial Center study of
Rule 11 found that judges are aware of the interest of the bar in Rule
11 and that "Rule 11 has generated a massive educational effort to
inform lawyers about their obligations under the rule." -1 Thus, it ap-
pears that the 1983 Advisory Committee's plan that judges use Rule
11 to remind attorneys of their obligations and to deal more effec-
tively with frivolous cases and unprofessional conduct has been effec-
tive. At the same time, attorneys appear to be getting the message.
2. The Bad News
a. Has Rule 11 Spawned a Cottage Industry?
Any fear that amended Rule 11 would be as little used as a basis for
imposing sanctions as its predecessor and other sanctions provisions
has proved totally unfounded, at least when one uses published deci-
sions as the yardstick. 5 5 The emphasis on fee-based sanctions re-
sulted in excessive satellite litigation. Indeed, some have said that
Rule 11 replaced civil RICO actions as the cottage industry of the
litigation bar." 6 Unfortunately, it is next to impossible to determine
whether the unreported experience is comparable to that of the re-
ported cases, or whether the reported decisions are merely the tip of
the iceberg."
Prior to 1983, there were only a handful of reported Rule 11 deci-
sions."8 Between August 1, 1983, and December 15, 1987, 688 Rule
11 decisions were published in the federal reporters, consisting of 496
district court opinions and 192 circuit court opinions. By 1989, the
number of reported district court cases appears to have leveled off.
The number of reported circuit court opinions continued to rise, how-
ever, as the circuit courts continued to struggle with interpreting the
rule. Moreover, the number of cases reported on computerized
253. 802 F.2d 247, 256 (7th Cir. 1986).
254. First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 58.
255. See id at 108-09.
256. See Michael Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later, Nat'l .J., Oct. 12, 1987,
at 3. But see Burbank, Third Circuit Report, supra note 6, at 60-62 ("On the basis of
our studies, we simply cannot agree either that Rule 11 is a cottage industry or that
Rule 11 motions are routine in the Third Circuit.").
257. See Burbank, Third Circuit Report, supra note 6, at 59; First FJC Report,
supra note 6, at 68.
258. D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L Rev. 1, 34-37
(1976) (reporting only 19 opinions, and only three in which a sanction was imposed).
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databases continued to rise until 1993, when Rule 11 was amended
again. 5 9 A search as of June 1993 revealed nearly 7000 cases.2 60
A very significant number of lawyers were affected by Rule 11. As
discussed above, the AJS study showed that over one-third of attor-
neys were involved in a sanctions motion during the prior year, and
that almost 55% had been the target of formal or informal threats of
Rule 11 sanctions.261 More recently, however, this trend began to re-
verse. The advent of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 has led to a
marked decline in formal Rule 11 activity. 62
b. Effects on the Settlement Process
An early finding of a Rule 11 violation may affect the outcome of
the suit. The sanctioned attorney would need to keep in mind the
threat of a sanction while continuing to litigate the action. Moreover,
on the positive side, by postponing the determination of the sanction
until the end of the case, the district court may create a climate that is
favorable to settling the action. On the other hand, the sanctioned
attorney may feel pressured to settle cheap in the hopes of having the
sanctions finding overturned.2 63 Lawyers believe that Rule 11 has an
impact on the settlement process, but the evidence is unclear as to
whether the overall impact is positive or negative.2 64
Indeed, some judges fear that Rule 11 leads to counterproductive
results. As Rule 11 motions, and in many cases cross-motions, be-
come more common, cordiality among attorneys breaks down, making
it harder to settle cases, and satellite Rule 11 litigation increases.2 65
The Federal Judicial Center Judge Survey suggests widespread disa-
259. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts File (Oct. 20, 1998) (search for sanc-
tion! and (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or Rule 11) and date(aft 1983) and date(bef 6/1993))
(revealing 6947 cases citing or interpreting Rule 11).
260. See supra note 259.
261. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 952 n.36, 954-56.
262. See Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12,
12 ("At this point, 'Rule 11 is pretty much dead."' (quoting Judge Milton Shadur of
the Northern District of Illinois)).
263. See, e.g., Denton v. Critikon, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 459, 461 (M.D. La. 1991) (stat-
ing that the plaintiff contended that the threat of sanctions tainted the voluntariness
of voluntary dismissal).
264. See First FJC Report, supra note 6, at 115-20; see also AJS Study, supra note 6,
at 964; Burbank, Third Circuit Report, supra note 6, at 85-88 (finding little evidence
that Rule 11 has poisoned relationships between the bench and the bar, and some
evidence that the rule has poisoned relationships among opposing counsel).
265. See Giorgio Morandi, Inc. v. Texport Corp., 139 F.R.D. 592, 594 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (requiring a "strong showing of willful disregard for Rule 11.... [as] a lesser
showing will only encourage litigators to bring Rule 11 motions and engage in profes-
sional discourtesy, preventing prompt resolution of disputes, the trial court's primary
function"); Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The amendment of Rule 11 ... has called forth a flood of... collateral disputes
within lawsuits, unrelated to the ultimate merits of the cases themselves."); Randy L.
Agnew, Comment, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescrip-
tions to Ease the Pain?, 15 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 887, 900-01 (1984); Jack B. Weinstein,
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greement regarding the effect of Rule 11 on the settlement process.266
More than two-thirds of the judges responding believed that either
Rule 11 has no impact on the settlement process-37%-or that the
net effect of the rule is even-32%-because the rule promotes settle-
ment as often as it impedes it. Twenty percent of the judges respond-
ing, however, believed that Rule 11 impedes settlement in more cases
than not. Only 11% think it encourages settlement.
Many judges did not respond to the question about settlement ef-
fects, probably because judges are not always privy to the settlement
practices or negotiations of the parties. To the extent that judges lack
meaningful information about the settlement process, their responses
may not be helpful. Taken together with their responses to a some-
what related question, however, one may be able to draw the infer-
ence that the overall impact of Rule 11 on the settlement process is
negative.
c. Lawyer Relationships
For the first few years after Rule 11 was amended, almost one-third
of the reported cases were out of the districts covering New York City
and Chicago. This percentage declined as Rule 11 took hold through-
out the country. Rule 11, at first, remained largely an urban phenom-
enon, perhaps because practice in these districts may be more
impersonal, with less good-will among the attorneys, leading to less
reluctance to bring Rule 11 motions. Similarly, the Third Circuit Task
Force concluded that local legal culture regarding attitudes towards
collegiality may have an effect on sanction incidence.267 Indeed, even
the most recent studies showed that sanctions motions were made
more frequently in urban areas, even as lawyers in all areas appeared
to be modifying their behavior in response to the existence of Rule
11.268
More recent studies also suggest that Rule 11 has a deleterious ef-
fect on lawyer relations. For example, the Federal Judicial Center re-
ported in 1991 that over 50% of the 483 federal district court judges
responding to its survey believed that Rule 11 motions exacerbate un-
necessarily contentious behavior of counsel toward one another.269
Only 7.9% think Rule 11 motions curtail such behavior, and 7.9%
think Rule 11 motions have no effect on the interactions of opposing
Reflections on 1983 Amendments to U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure, N.Y. U., Nov. 14,
1983, at 1.
266. See FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 2A, at 10-11.
267. See Burbank, Third Circuit Report, supra note 6. at 62-65. In fact, most of the
New Jersey cases involved New York lawyers. In one New Jersey case, the New
Jersey local counsel "believed that the Rule 11 issue was raised because two New
York attorneys were fighting like cats and dogs over discovery disputes.... had [it]
been two New Jersey attorneys, it would not have happened." Id. at 63.
268. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 977.
269. See FJC Final Report, supra note 6, § 2A, at 9-10.
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counsel.27 ° Similarly, Professor Nelkin's study of the Northern Dis-
trict of California reports that Rule 11 "has increased the hostility
level in federal court significantly."'27' Forty-nine percent of respon-
dents indicated that relations among lawyers had deteriorated, and
only 3% thought relations had improved. Respondents also indicated
that they thought Rule 11 caused attorney relationships with the
bench to worsen, while only 3% thought Rule 11 had resulted in an
improved relationship with the bench.272
The 1992 AJS study reported that 64% of the lawyers surveyed
thought that Rule 11 had decreased civility, while 36% thought that
the rule improved civility.27 3 Perhaps more significantly, almost a
third-29.3 %-of the participants in that survey thought that the im-
pact on civility was the most significant impact of Rule 11.274 This is
quite interesting because that percentage is greater than those who
thought the most significant impact was increased factual investiga-
tion-22.9%-or increased legal research-5.4%-or increased
fees-5.0%. Accordingly, although Rule 11, in contrast to the failure
of disciplinary boards, has demonstrably altered some attorney con-
duct for the better, it appears that the most significant impact of the
rule has been to cause a decline in civility. Thus, it is understandable
that Rule 11 has been amended to reduce the number of contentious
motions and to encourage non-monetary sanctions designed to im-
prove practice,2 75 and that the bar and the bench has turned to civility
codes as the next great solution to the problems of the profession.276
IV. THE RELATIVE IMPACT AND ROLE OF RULE 11 AND
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE ON ATTORNEY CONDUCT
Early in the debate about amended Rule 11, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York held a Symposium on Rule 11. One of
the participants, Hon. Kevin Thomas Duffy, of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, noted that Rule 11
came about because the organized bar had not done its job:
Why do lawyers bring stupid, senseless, baseless lawsuits? Because
they get away with it. The organized bar itself is supposed to watch
out for the activities of lawyers. Has the organized bar met its own
requirements? Are lawyers still bringing stupid, senseless, baseless
lawsuits? Sure. Why aren't they disbarred? Well, they are not, and
it is quite obvious to the judiciary that if the organized bar is not
270. Thirty-four percent of the judges believed that Rule 11 had no net effect on
the parties' behavior because in some cases it exacerbates poor behavior and in others
it curtails it. See id. § 2A, at 10.
271. Nelken, supra note 6, at 150 (citing comments of a study participant).
272. See id.
273. See AJS Study, supra note 6, at 964.
274. See id.
275. See infra Part IV.
276. See infra Part V.
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going to clean its own house then somebody has got to do some-
thing about it. Isn't it nice of the organized bar to s , "Hey we
have got a problem, let's pass it off to the judiciary."-
As discussed in Part II, Rule 11 was interpreted to provide a basis
for sanctioning a wide range of conduct. As Judge Duffy suggests, the
organized bar had not historically dealt with such conduct.27 8 There is
a question whether it is appropriate for the courts, in contrast to or-
ganized bar discipline, to sanction such conduct. 9 Indeed, the courts
themselves have questioned the propriety of using Rule 11 to deter
unprofessional conduct.
For example, Judge William W Schwarzer,l s a leading proponent of
Rule 11 in its early years, interpreted Rule 11 expansively to cover
attorneys' ethical obligations to avoid misrepresentations and to force
attorneys to be more precise in characterizing their arguments, the so-
called "Duty of Candor." In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Bur-
roughs Corp.,"' the defendant's attorneys, from a prominent law firm,
made the mistakes of characterizing their argument on a motion to
dismiss as one based on existing law and of failing to cite adverse au-
thority. After the court denied the motion to dismiss, it directed the
defendant to submit a memorandum explaining why Rule 11 sanctions
should not be imposed.
In its Rule 11 memorandum, it became clear that the motion to dis-
miss was based not on existing law, but rather on "a good faith argu-
ment for the extension ... of existing law."'  The court stated that
the defendant's Rule 11 memorandum presented the argument
277. Kevin Thomas Duffy, Amended Rule 11 of tie Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 20 (1985).
278. See id.; see also Sol Linowitz & Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession:
Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century 141 (1994) (arguing that various disci-
plinary authorities have not effectively discharged their responsibilities).
279. See, e.g., Stephen R. Ripps & John N. Drowatzky, Federal Rule 1: Are the
Federal District Courts Usurping the Disciplinary Function of tie Bar?, 32 Val. U.L
Rev. 67 (1997) (arguing that Rule 11 violations should be reported to disciplinary
boards for appropriate action). See generally Wilkins, supra note 4 (discussing the rise
of new agencies, including judicial enforcement of Rule 11, for enforcement of rules
of professional conduct and arguing that multiple enforcement by new agencies as
weU as traditional organized bar enforcement can be efficient and compatible with
professional independence).
280. Judge Schwarzer has written a number of influential articles about Rule 11.
See Widliam W Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a Nets, Era, 28 Loy. LA. L Rev. 7 (1994)
(discussing the 1993 amendments to Rule 11); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revis-
ited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1015-24 (1988) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited]
(arguing that there were some problems with Rule 11 and proposing interpretative
solutions); Wliam W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 1]-A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 204-05 (1985) (arguing that the proper administration of Rule
11 is a valuable tool for improving litigation) [hereinafter Schwarzer, A Closer Look].
281. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
282. Id. at 126.
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with exemplary clarity and fairness. The difficulty is that this is not
the argument presented when the motion was made. Had it been
made then, there would be no question that it would have qualified
under Rule 11 as "a good faith argument for the extension ... of
existing law" and the issue of sanctions would never have arisen.
Instead of doing what they have now done, counsel presented an
argument calculated to lead the Court to believe that it was "war-
ranted by existing law."
283
The court then reproduced in its opinion the relevant portions of
the two briefs, and concluded:
The contrast between the two memoranda speaks for itself. It is a
dramatic illustration of the sort of practice at which Rule 11 is
aimed and result it seeks to achieve. There would be little point to
Rule 11 if it tolerated counsel making an argument for the extension
of existing law disguised as one based on existing law. The certifica-
tion made by counsel signing the motion is not intended to leave the
court guessing as to which argument is being made, let alone to per-
mit counsel to lead the court to believe that an argument is sup-
ported by existing law when it is not.
The duty of candor is a necessary corollary of the certification
required by Rule 11. A court has a right to expect that counsel will
state the controlling law fairly and fully; indeed, unless that is done
the court cannot perform its task properly. A lawyer must not mis-
state the law, fail to disclose adverse authority (not disclosed by his
opponent), or omit facts critical to the application of the rule of law
relied on.284
The Ninth Circuit reversed this interpretation of Rule 11.285 The
court began by reviewing the policies underlying Rule 11 and the de-
veloping case law. This review demonstrated that: "If, judged by an
objective standard, a reasonable basis for the position exists in both
law and in fact at the time that the position is adopted, then sanctions
should not be imposed. ' 286 The court then noted that the district
court agreed that the motion was nonfrivolous, but objected to the
way in which the motion was presented. While complimenting the dis-
trict court for its "salutary admonitions against misstatements of the
law, failure to disclose directly adverse authority, or omission of criti-
cal facts," '287 the Ninth Circuit said that it was "with Rule 11 that we
must deal. '288 The court emphatically rejected the district court's in-
terpretation of Rule 11 which would require "district courts to judge
the ethical propriety of lawyers' conduct with respect to every piece of
283. Id.
284. Id. at 127.
285. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
286. Id. at 1538 (citations omitted).
287. Id. at 1539.
288. Id.
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paper filed in federal court." 9 Moreover, "[a]sking judges to grade
accuracy of advocacy in connection with every piece of paper filed in
federal court multiplies the decisions which the court must make as
well as the cost for litigants."29 A petition for rehearing en bane was
denied, but five judges on the Ninth Circuit registered a vehement
dissent, chiding the rest of the court for its refusal to recognize the
ethical obligation implicit in Rule 11.291
The confusion in the Ninth Circuit was typical. The circuit courts
disagreed over a number of important aspects of the rule. A unani-
mous en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit, Thomas v. Capital Security
Services, Inc.,292 and a Third Circuit opinion, Gaiardo v. Ethyl
Corp.,293 recognized that Rule 11 itself had become the source of
abuse, and that some interpretations of the rule were counterproduc-
tive and insufficiently respectful of novel theories. None of these deci-
sions, however, articulated a vision of the role Rule 11 should play in
enforcing ethical standards that should have been enforced by formal
disciplinary authorities.
Nevertheless, the courts began to impose disciplinary-type sanctions
on attorneys who failed to live up to the new judicially-imposed pro-
fessional standards of conduct. Under Rule 11, especially the 1993
version, courts have been imposing various types of non-monetary
sanctions and, in fact, are encouraged to carefully choose the sanction
most appropriate for the violation and the offender. By considering
sanctions other than attorneys' fees, courts can serve the deterrent
purpose of Rule 11 without encouraging the contentious satellite liti-
gation that led to decreased civility. Perhaps such sanctions will be
more effective in promoting improved attorney conduct.
a. Repriniands
A public reprimand of a sanctioned attorney can be an appropriate
sanction,2 94 particularly for a first time offender, or when the violation
is not willful.195 For example, in Langer v. Monarch Life Insurance
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1540
291. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 584 (9th
Cir. 1987) (en banc).
292. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
293. 835 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1987).
294. See Schwarzer, A Closer Look, supra note 280, at 201-02.
295. See, e.g., Unanue-Casal v. Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839 (lst Cir. 1990) (choos-
ing a reprimand as the appropriate sanction); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 878 n.18 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("'Influenced by the particular facts of a
case, the court may decide that the circumstances warrant imposition of... perhaps
only a reprimand."' (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc.. 788 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir.
1986))); Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1066 (7th Cir.
1987) ("[A] public censure, an important method of professional discipline, may be
called for even when a monetary sanction is not." (citations omitted)); It re Curl, 803
F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the "'public admonishment of this opin-
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Co., the district court found that the plaintiff violated Rule 11, but did
not impose attorney's fees as the sanction.296 Instead, it reprimanded
counsel for his unprofessional conduct.297 The defendant appealed,
arguing that the district court had failed to impose a sanction as re-
quired under Rule 11.298 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court,
noting that in some circumstances a reprimand is an appropriate sanc-
tion, and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion.299
Among the circumstances justifying the sanction chosen was the hard-
ball nature of the litigation by equally strong parties and well-
matched, able counsel.300
Courts are mindful of the deterrent effect of public reprimands. For
example, in Burger v. Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York,30 1
sanctioned attorneys requested that their names be deleted from the
court's opinion.30 2 The court denied this request explaining,
"[n]aming the individuals responsible serves the deterrent effect of
Rule 11 . . . . Deletion of the attorneys' names would vitiate the
rule.' '303 Courts view a reprimand as a serious sanction. In Traina v.
United States,304 for example, plaintiff's counsel argued that monetary
sanctions should not be imposed against him under Rule 11 because
his adversary had earlier been sanctioned with a reprimand. The Fifth
Circuit noted that plaintiff's counsel did not complain that monetary
sanctions were inappropriate, but rather that in his view his adversary
had received a less severe sanction.30 5 The circuit court did not agree.
The district court's admonition was as follows:
Counsel is admonished about her reliance on [inapplicable case law]
and is warned that her advocacy will receive strict scrutiny in future
cases.... [C]ounsel is hereby reprimanded for what was at the least
a careless reading of the caselaw. She is ordered to show a copy of
this Order and Reasons to her supervisor and to certify to the Court
that she has done so. 3 0 6
ion," instead of monetary sanction, suffices because violation was not intentional),
overruled on other grounds by Partington v. Gedan, 923 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc); Corporate Printing Co. v. New York Typographical Union No. 6, 886 F. Supp.
340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); C.T. Shipping, Ltd. v. DMI (U.S.A) Ltd., 774 F.
Supp. 146, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Atkins v. Marathon Le Tourneau Co., 130
F.R.D. 625, 627 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (same).
296. 966 F.2d 786, 810-12 (3d Cir. 1992).
297. See id. at 811.
298. See id. at 810.
299. See id. at 811.
300. See id. at 811-12.
301. No. 87 Civ. 8238, 1988 WL 60268 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1988).
302. See id. at *1.
303. Id.
304. 911 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1990).
305. See id.
306. Id.
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The Fifth Circuit then noted: "To characterize the above repri-
mand, as does appellant, as 'to simply admonish' is an absurd under-
statement. In our view, the above reprimand was significantly more
severe than the relatively insignificant sum [$335.63] assessed against
[plaintiff s] counsel .... No abuse of discretion by the district court is
shown."3 o7
Other circuit courts are reminding the lower courts that a repri-
mand is a sanction that ought to be considered. For example, in
Figueroa-Ruiz v. Alegria,308 the district court failed to properly decide
a Rule 11 motion." 9 The First Circuit reversed and remanded with
instructions to impose a sanction if Rule 11 had been violated. 310 Ap-
parently believing that the district court denied the Rule 11 motion
because it thought monetary sanctions were inappropriate, the First
Circuit specifically noted that a reprimand is an appropriate
sanction.31'
This is a positive development because it should move the courts
away from fee-shifting sanctions.312 By publishing the opinion which
outlines the offender's infraction, the court in effect publicly repri-
mands the attorney.31 3 A less severe method of reprimand would be
an oral reprimand in court.314
b. Disciplinary Action
A court may consider disciplinary action against an attorney who
violates Rule 11 to be appropriate. Most courts prefer to bring the
offending conduct to the attention of the appropriate disciplinary
committee, rather than disciplining the attorney directly. For exam-
ple, in Steinle v. Warren,"' the court directed the court clerk to for-
307. Id- (citation omitted).
308. 905 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1990).
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. Other commentators view reprimands as an appropriate sanction. See, e.g.,
Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility,
75 Minn. L. Rev. 793, 808 (1991) (arguing for making public the identity of the sanc-
tioned attorney as a deterrent against future misconduct).
313. See, eg., Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. I11.
1990) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions and holding "that the appropriate sanction is cen-
sure of [plaintiff's] counsel, and this order shall serve as that censure"); United States
v. Minisee, 113 F.R.D. 121, 123 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding that "a reprimand of coun-
sel is the appropriate sanction").
314. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987) (-In addition to
financial penalties courts may sanction by warning, oral reprimands in open court, or
written admonition."). For other cases in which reprimands were the Rule 11 sanc-
tion imposed, see Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 9.03(b)(2)(A).
315. 765 F.2d 95, 102 (7th Cir. 1985); see also In re Rainwater, 124 B.R. 133, 140-41
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions should be ap-
plied to the junior associate who signed the frivolous papers, as well as the non-signa-
tory senior attorney who reviewed the papers, and sending a copy of the sanction
order to the state disciplinary committee), Polanco v. 21 Arden Realty Corp., 121
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ward a copy of the sanctions opinion to the state board of professional
responsibility. In Cannon v. Loyola University of Chicago,3 16 the
court directed "the clerk to send a copy of the opinion to the Illinois
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission and the Execu-
tive Committee of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for whatever actions they deem appropriate. ' 317 A
bankruptcy court noted the utility of referring sanctions matters to
disciplinary bodies. In In re Shuma, debtors had filed a motion for
recusal to remove a judge, the trustee, and the trustee's counsel. 318
The bankruptcy court, applying Rule 11 case law, imposed Bank-
ruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions against debtors' counsel.3 19 The court im-
posed a $375 sanction award,310 but because "[i]mposing a mere
monetary sanction in this instance would be tantamount to wielding a
cardboard sword when a dragon looms ahead," the court also referred
the sanction decision to the district's disciplinary committee.2 1
One commentator believes that Rule 11 violations regularly should
be reported to disciplinary authorities as a vehicle for improving pro-
fessional responsibility. Professor Kramer wrote:
To maximize the deterrent effect of Rule 11 sanctions, courts should
ensure that the identity of sanctioned lawyers is a matter of public
record, and should routinely report imposition of sanctions on law-
yers to the state bar disciplinary bodies of the fifty states....
Once a court has imposed a sanction on an attorney, it is difficult
to justify not reporting the sanction to the disciplinary body of the
jurisdiction which has authorized the sanctioned attorney to engage
in the practice of law. Reporting of Rule 11 sanctions will give state
disciplinary authorities an opportunity to review the records of at-
torneys who previously had violated the state's code of professional
responsibility in light of their Rule 11 violations. Regular reporting
of all Rule 11 sanctions to state disciplinary authorities also would
disclose multiple Rule 11 sanctions against the same lawyer. To ef-
fectively use this information, state disciplinary bodies should inves-
B.R. 425, 427-28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (sanctioning defendant and his counsel
$2500 for removing a state court contempt action without proper jurisdiction and
sending a copy of the opinion to the disciplinary committees of state and federal
courts).
316. 676 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 687 F. Supp. 424
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
317. Id. at 831 n.8; see also Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 110-11 (D.N.J. 1994)
(sanctioning plaintiff's attorney and ruling that his conduct warranted dismissal of the
complaint, payment of attorneys' fees, and referral to state disciplinary authorities),
affd, 52 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 1995); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878
n.18 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("'In other cases, reference to a bar association griev-
ance committee may be appropriate."' (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d
151, 158 (3d Cir. 1986))).
318. In re Shuma, 124 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
319. See id. at 675.
320. See id. at 679.
321. Id. at 676.
[Vol. 67
RULE 11 AND THE PROFESSION
tigate every lawyer who has received more than one Rule 11
sanction. Reporting by federal district clerks to state authorities
would make this salutary practice possible.3
Professor Kramer's suggestion, together with a deemphasis on at-
torney's fees as the preferred Rule 11 sanction, has merit. Attorneys
have always had a duty to report violations of professional responsi-
bility codes, but they have not always done so. To the extent that
Rule 11 incorporates aspects of such codes, i.e., the duty to represent
a client zealously, but not to engage in abusive practices or to file
groundless papers, Professor Kramer's suggestion is valuable. More
importantly, it is unlikely that an adversary would move under Rule
11 seeking such sanctions when there is little to no prospect of ob-
taining attorney's fees. Thus, Rule 11 motions would be reserved for
the most egregious cases.
On the other hand, when an attorney is sanctioned for some negli-
gently filed paper, and that attorney has never engaged in abusive
conduct or violated Rule 11 before, it seems unduly harsh to immedi-
ately report the offender to disciplinary authorities. Professor Parness
has noted that under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, courts are
more likely to make disciplinary referrals as a sanction.323 He pro-
poses standards and guidelines for such referrals, and argues that
courts should distinguish between major and minor violations of Rule
11.324 For example, violations implicating attorney honesty should be
treated more harshly. 325
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has noted that when the court chooses
to take disciplinary action itself, there may be a due process problem.
In Thomas v. Capital Security Senices, Inc.,326 the court stated: "Fi-
nally, as to disciplinary action applied to an attorney under Rule 11,
district courts should recognize a very real problem that might arise;
due process considerations emerge if this type of penalty is
applied. 3
27
Nevertheless, courts have imposed or threatened to impose discipli-
nary measures. In In re Boucher,3- the plaintiffs attorney was sus-
pended from practice for six months because he misrepresented the
factual record on appeal in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 28(a)(3). 329 Two other courts have issued warnings. In In
322. Kramer, supra note 312, at 808-09 (footnotes omitted).
323. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under New Federal Civil Rile 11,
61 Tenn. L. Rev. 37, 44 (1993).
324. See id. at 59-61.
325. See id at 60.
326. 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988).
327. Id. at 878 (citation and footnote omitted).
328. 837 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1988), mnodifled, 850 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1988).
329. See id. at 871.
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re Curl330 the court stated that the court "will not hesitate to sanction
future negligence with substantial monetary fines, suspension, or dis-
barment from practice before our court. ' 3 3 1 Similarly, in Donaldson
v. Clark,332 the court noted that "sanctions may include.., suspension
or disbarment from practice. '333 In American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied
Pilots Ass'n,33 4 the Fifth Circuit affirmed Rule 11 sanctions of disbar-
ment from practice before the district court in any matter for periods
ranging from thirty days to six months.335 Moreover, a court is more
likely to take disciplinary action when the attorney is a repeat of-
fender of Rule 11.336
On the other hand, a more drastic sanction than that discussed in
American Airlines, such as suspending an attorney for two years from
practicing before the district court, may be inappropriate. The Fifth
Circuit has stated that "when a district court finds that a disciplinary
sanction more severe than admonition, reprimand, or censure under
Rule 11 is warranted, it should refer the matter to the appropriate
disciplinary authorities. 337
c. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
The court may consider mandatory legal education for attorneys a
proper sanction. In Stevens v. City of Brockton,338 the court found
that both attorneys had violated Rule 11. 339 The court decided against
imposing a monetary sanction, explaining that "[a]warding costs to
both sides would simply cause a shuffling of funds, with the penalties
canceling each other out . . . . But an affirmative sanction is more
likely to emphasize to the attorneys the unnecessary carelessness of
330. 803 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Partington v.
Gedan, 923 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
331. Id. at 1007.
332. 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
333. Id. at 1557 n.7 (citation omitted).
334. 968 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1992).
335. See id. at 533.
336. See, e.g., McGoldrick Oil Co. v. Campbell, Athey & Zukowski, 793 F.2d 649,
654 (5th Cir. 1986) (directing the clerk to forward the opinion to state grievance com-
mittees, noting that the sanctioned attorney is already the subject of disciplinary pro-
ceedings); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(referring attorney to state disciplinary group "because of his pattern of abuse of the
judicial process"); see also Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 684, 690 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) (imposing monetary sanctions instead of revoking attorney's license to
practice).
337. Thornton v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
338. 676 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1987).
339. See id. at 27.
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their conduct."" 4 As an alternative, the court ordered both attorneys
to attend a day-long program on federal trial practice.34
In Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hospital, Inc., 2 the court or-
dered a recent law school graduate to attend a continuing legal educa-
tion program on federal practice and procedure, and to attend at least
five sessions of an Inns of Court program. 3 The senior attorneys in
the firm were subjected to monetary sanctions. 4
The district court in Bergeron v. Northwest Publications Inc. 5 also
believed that continuing legal education was an appropriate sanc-
tion.4' The court noted that the focus of the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 was on deterrence rather than compensation, and that the
least severe sanction to achieve that purpose ought to be imposed.4 7
The plaintiff's attorney, according to the court, had "filed rambling,
confusing and contradictory motions" that reflected "a fundamental
lack of knowledge of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'-  The
court also noted that the attorney had been sanctioned before, but
after being sanctioned he remained either "unrepetentant, or... he
still does not understand what he did wrong." 9 An example of the
attorney's mistakes was an irrelevant, "improper and incomprehensi-
ble reference to the 1995 [Oklahoma City] bombing" that could be
interpreted as a "veiled threat" to the court or as "disrespectful to the
victims of that atrocity."350
Under the circumstances, the district court decided that the most
appropriate sanction was a private course on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the local rules of the court.3-1 The court specified
that the course be taught by a professor of an accredited law school,
and that the course consist of at least forty hours of individualized
instruction.3 52 An affidavit by the attorney and the law professor had
340. Id.; see also LaVigna v. WABC Television, Inc., 159 F.R.D. 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (fining plaintiffs attorney $250 and ordering the attorney to attend 12 hours of
CLE on federal civil procedure and employment discrimination law): Del Canto v.
ITT Sheraton Corp., 865 F. Supp. 934, 940 (D.D.C. 1994) (accepting offer of payment
of $500 to the court to support scholarships for other attorneys to attend CLE), affd
sub nom. Del Canto v. Richardson, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Oxfurth v. Siemens
A.G., 142 F.R.D. 424,428 (D.N.J. 1991) (requiring attorney to attend four CLE semi-
nars, including one on law office management, one on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and the other two on federal practice in general, over an 18-month period).
341. See Stevens, 676 F. Supp. at 27.
342. 135 F.R.D. 139 (M.D. La. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 960 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.
1992).
343. See i at 154-55.
344. See id.
345. 165 F.R.D. 518 (D. Minn. 1996).
346. See id. at 523.
347. See id. at 521.
348. Id. at 522.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 523.
352. See id.
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to be filed, stating that the attorney completed the course and is profi-
cient in the practice of law. 35 3
The District Court for the District of Columbia, adopting a sugges-
tion by the targeted attorney, imposed a sanction which required the
sanctioned attorney to deposit $500 to the registry of the court which
would be used to provide scholarships for two young attorneys.35"
The scholarships would enable the attorneys, who had between five
and ten years experience litigating cases on a contingent fee basis, to
attend continuing legal education programs. 5
In determining the sanction, the court looked to the purpose of the
1993 amendments, which were designed to deemphasize fee-based
sanctions in favor of sanctions with a deterrent orientation. 6 The
court noted with sympathy the plaintiff's lawyers argument that Rule
11 sanctions could chill effective advocacy by lawyers who operate on
a contingent fee basis.357 Because of the conduct of the attorney,
however, some sanction was appropriate. The court also ordered the
lawyer to pay an additional $3500 to the defendant.
d. Mandatory Pro Bono
In Bleckner v. General Accident Insurance Co. of America,359 the
court found that although the plaintiff violated Rule 11, fee-shifting
sanctions were unwarranted:
[Defendant's] attorneys themselves missed many of the legal issues
raised and in any event spent little effort defending against the
[sanctionable] count. Indeed, the rule 11 violations in this case
flowed less from bad faith than carefree lawyering. [Plaintiff's] at-
torneys have wasted judicial resources that could have been used
for the resolution of meritorious claims. An appropriate sanction
should compensate the federal courts.360
The appropriate sanction the court chose was to require the plaintiff's
counsel to undertake representation of a pro se plaintiff from the dis-
trict court judge's docket.36 a
Assuming counsel does a credible job, and does not engage in fur-
ther sanctionable conduct, this sanction would be a positive step to the
extent that it provides for adequate legal services to the indigent. It is
353. See id.
354. See Del Canto v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 865 F. Supp. 934, 940 (D.D.C. 1994),
affd sub nom. Del Canto v. Richardson, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
355. See id.
356. See id. at 939.
357. See id.
358. See id. at 940.
359. 713 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
360. Id. at 653 (footnote omitted).
361. See id.
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unclear, however, whether the court has the power to employ such a
sanction.362
e. Scarlet Letters
Some courts are requiring sanctioned attorneys to inform other
courts about past Rule 11 violations. For example, the district court in
In re Omnitrition International, Inc. Securities Litigation,3 63 ordered a
law firm, which engaged in class action litigation as class counsel, to
provide any court in which it sought to serve as class counsel with a
copy of the order imposing sanctions against it.3" Unfortunately, the
court failed to distinguish adequately between the conduct of the law-
yer involved, who had forged signatures on affidavits, and the law firm
itself which sought to correct the situation as soon as the partnership
became aware of the wrongdoing. The law firm appealed this "scarlet
letter" sanction and made a motion in the district court to have it
vacated.
The district court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the mo-
tion, and, after examining the records submitted to the court ex parte,
the court vacated the order. It found that the order to provide copies
of the opinion imposing sanctions "had and will likely continue to
have an unintended and unnecessarily harsh effect on the firm." 3
Moreover, the court found that the Order had already accomplished
its goal of encouraging the firm to take steps to deter comparable fu-
ture conduct. The court, however, rejected the efforts of the law firm
to escape Rule 11 liability entirely, reaffirming its view that the part-
nership had not acted appropriately.
A law firm can no longer escape liability for the wrongdoing of its
individual attorneys. Rule 11 makes law firms an appropriate target
for Rule 11 sanctions. In addition, as the district court pointed out,
state ethical rules make lav firms responsible for the acts of their indi-
vidual lawyers.366 The problem, however, is in the nature of the sanc-
tion. It may well be appropriate to shift all or part of a fee-based
sanction to the law firm for the determinable harm caused by the acts
of an individual lawyer. However, without explicit findings on the
part of the district court as to the nature of the law firm's culpability, it
is inappropriate to impose a sanction which suggests that the firm, as
362. The court recognized that the Supreme Court, in Mallard v. United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 302-04 (1989), held that
courts could request attorneys to undertake pro bono representation, but that 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) did not empower courts to order such representation. See Cohen v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653, 653 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Whether Rule
11 so empowers the court is the open question.
363. No. C 92-4133, 1994 WL 476694, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19. 1994).
364. See id. at *8.
365. In re Omnitrition Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig.. No. C 92-4133, 1995 WL 626529, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1995).
366. See id. at *3.
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opposed to an individual lawyer, practices unethically. If there is one
bad apple, other courts ought to be warned about it. But there is no
reason to raise a cloud over the rest of the tree, unless explicit evi-
dence warrants it.
An example of where the "tree" was sanctioned is Massey v. Prince
George's County. 67 In Massey, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights action against the police for use of excessive
force.368 The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.369 Subsequently, the court became aware of a case-the "Kopf
case"-decided by the controlling court of appeals, which was directly
adverse to the defendants' position in the motion for summary judg-
ment, and which the County Attorney's office had defended.370
Neither the defendants, nor the plaintiff had cited the case, nor raised
the case in oral argument, even though the defendant in the instant
case had been the defendant in the Kopf case.3 71 The court ordered
the defendants to show cause why the case had not been cited.372
The defendants' first response was that the Assistant County Attor-
ney handling the instant case did not know of the Kopf case, possibly
because he joined the office after the case had been decided.373 Fur-
ther, they argued that the Assistant County Attorney who had han-
dled Kopf did not participate in the instant case.374 The court took the
County Attorneys office to task:
[Defendants'] further suggestion that more senior County Attor-
neys were not involved in the Kopf case (despite the presence of
their names on the brief) or were not actively involved in the pres-
ent case provides no justification at all. Attorneys who affix their
names to a brief have an obligation to know what it is they are sign-
ing .... Moreover, Senior County Attorneys ought to be supervis-
ing the pleadings of more junior assistants .... It should never
happen that an excessive force case in which [the current defendant]
itself was a defendant, which went to the Fourth Circuit and is car-
ried in the Federal Reporter, is not pervasively known throughout
the County Attorney's Office. 3 7 5
The court declined to impose individual sanctions under Rule 11.316
However, it did issue an extensive order requiring the defendants' of-
fice to reveal to the court every case involving police brutality that
was being handled by the County Attorneys' Office, the status of the
367. 918 F. Supp. 905 (D. Md. 1996).
368. See id. at 906.
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 906-07.
375. Id. at 908-09.
376. See id.
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case, and a statement as to whether the Kopf case was cited in disposi-
tive motions.377 The court informed the defendants that it would no-
tify the judges handling the other excessive force cases about the
problem "and leave it to each judge to follow up on the matter as the
judge sees fit." 378
Another court required the sanctioned attorney to write letters of
apology to the opposing attorneys. 379 The apology had to be "courte-
ous in tone [and] specific in retracting the unfounded charges."'  The
requirement of an apology was in addition to the imposition of mone-
tary sanctions. 8'
f. Taking Opposing Counsel Out to Lunch
The court in Johnson v. Sullivan,382 noted that the defense's conduct
"probably merits" Rule 11 sanctions.3s Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to grant the plaintiff's motion for sanctions:
The imposition of such sanctions would unfairly single out the [de-
fendant U.S. Government] as the sole villain in this litigation. At
various points in the litigation, attorneys on both sides have en-
gaged in unreasonable conduct, advancing legal arguments that
were highly questionable if not indefensible. The court attributes
this phenomenon to the rancorous relationship that has developed
between the lawyers, a blood feud that evokes images of the
Montagues and the Capulets. The attorneys' animosity toward each
other has transformed zealous advocacy of noble principles into in-
flexible adherence to untenable positions. In this war of words be-
tween the attorneys, the only casualties have been the class
members, some of whom have died while awaiting a rehearing on
their disability claims. Although plaintiffs' attorneys may fancy
themselves the white knights of this litigation, their outrageous pos-
turing has contributed to the delay in their clients' receipt of
relief.384
Because attorneys for both sides of the litigation engaged in mis-
conduct, the court "[saw] no point in sanctioning either of the parties
at this late stage of the lawsuit."3" The court apparently thought that
denying the motion and imposing stricter guidelines for the defend-
ant's compliance with the remedial order would contribute to
377. See id at 909-12.
378. Id. at 909.
379. See Nault's Auto Sales v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 37
(D.N.H. 1993).
380. Id.
381. See id. at 38.
382. 714 F. Supp 1476 (N.D. Il1. 1989), affd. 922 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1990).
383. Id at 1486.
384. Id
385. Id
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"restor[ing] some semblance of civility and reasonableness to the
litigation. 386
The court, however, missed a perfect opportunity to be creative.
Perhaps there was no justification for imposing attorneys' fees as the
appropriate sanction. Certainly, the plaintiffs' attorney should not re-
ceive a windfall when he himself engaged in improper tactics. Perhaps
the court should have considered a combination of sanctions, and
should have imposed them at the time of the conduct rather than
waiting.
Rule 11 is part of a package to control litigation abuses. Clearly,
Johnson was a hard-fought case. It is equally clear that the court tried
its best to control the conduct of the litigation, which bounced around
all levels of the federal judiciary. Aggressive use of Rule 16 manage-
ment tools, together with prompt action at the time of a Rule 11 viola-
tion, may help the court.
Perhaps Johnson was an appropriate case for a novel sanction sug-
gested at a Judicial Conference in 1987. A participant in those pro-
ceedings found that much of the grenade throwing in litigation
resulted from the attorneys' lack of familiarity with each other. Ac-
cordingly, he suggested, somewhat tongue in cheek, a revision to the
local rules which would require opposing counsel to have lunch with
each other within ten days after the filing of the answer to improve the
litigation climate.387
It may be pure fantasy to think that dining together will solve our
litigation ills. The breakdown in cordiality, however, certainly con-
tributes to the problem, and Rule 11 sanctions historically have con-
tributed to the problem. As Judge Schwarzer has noted, "sanction-
prone lawyers are not likely to litigate on a platonic level."388 The
Third Circuit Study on Rule 11 shows that one reason why the Third
Circuit has relatively few problems with Rule 11 is that relations
among members of the bar are better than in New York, which has
had a very high level of Rule 11 activity.389
386. Id.
387. See Robert Jordan, Remarks at the Forty-Eighth Judicial Conference of the
District of Columbia (May 28, 1987), in Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Judicial Con-
ference of the District of Cohmbia, 119 F.R.D. 461, 487 (1988).
388. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 280, at 1018 ("[Rule 11] carries with it
the potential for increased tension among the parties and with the court .... [which
makes] it more difficult to conduct the litigation in a rational manner and reach ac-
comodation."); see Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that Rule 11 contributes to breakdowns in cordiality which makes set-
tlements more difficult to achieve).
389. See Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions, supra note 1, § 2.02(b)(2), at 15.
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V. THE CONTINUING DECLINE IN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
The operation of the 1983 version of Rule 11 led to many problems
that have been discussed at length elsewhere.3  These problems led
to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, which, in turn, have led to a great
decline in Rule 11 activity. The "safe harbor" provision, which pro-
vides one free bite, and the deemphasis on compensatory sanctions
have reduced the incentive for lawyers to file Rule 11 motions. Thus,
the "satellite litigation" problem has essentially disappeared, and, ar-
guably, the chilling effect problem has been ameliorated as well. 391
What is the legacy of Rule 11, then, as it pertains to the topic of this
Symposium?
Rule 11 has been replaced by an increased emphasis on other sanc-
tions tools, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power.
Now that the consciousness of the bench and bar regarding the need
for sanctions in egregious cases has been raised, these tools appear to
be used with much greater frequency than before Rule 11 was
amended in 1983. While all these sanctions tools may have been rela-
tively effective in dealing with some of the abuses about which lawyers
had been complaining, such as unprepared, sloppy, or incompetent
practice, sanctions tools have been ineffective in creating an improved
litigation environment. Specifically, the increase in incivility has nega-
tively affected the resolution of cases.
Hence, the good news is that Rule 11 did a better job than formal
disciplinary processes of improving some attorney conduct. To the ex-
tent, however, that Rule 11 became another attack tool of the aggres-
sive, Rambo-type lawyer, it has become part of the professionalism
problem, and, therefore, has had no positive effect in improving the
public's perception of the profession. Significantly, the bar may be
turning to a more positive approach to self-regulation by promulgat-
ing "civility codes." Although it is hard to imagine that the largely
aspirational civility codes will have a better chance of actually chang-
ing lawyer behavior,392 these codes may provide a better foundation
for helping the profession improve its standing in the public mind.
Certainly, improving the public's perception of the profession is a
positive goal. This does not mean, however, that I buy into the notion
390. See generally id. §§ 1.07-1.08, at 19-60 (criticizing the 1983 amended rule and
suggesting further amendments).
391. But see Vairo, Past as Prologue, supra note 1, at 40-52. 75-78 (discussing how
many of the Rule's old problems remain).
392. For example, the reason why the American Bar Association undertook the
task of formulating the Model Rules with enforcement power was because the aspira-
tional codes lacked any enforcement mechanism, and were therefore ineffective in
curbing the perceived problems of the profession. See Lino\vitz & Mayer. supra note
278, at 139-66; Cooper & Humphreys, supra note 12, at 927-28: Colin Croft, Recon-
ceptualizing American Legal Professionalisn. A Proposal for Deliberative Moral
Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1256, 1304-1321 (1992); Wilkins, supra note 4, at 801-
04.
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that the return of the lawyer-statesman is the ultimate goal,3 93 espe-
cially to the extent that such an ideal conjures up the picture of an
elite, non-diverse, exclusionary profession.394  Rather, in a society
governed by the rule of law, it is obviously important for society in
general to have confidence in lawyers because lawyers play such
prominent roles in all aspects of our legal system. 395 Recent attempts
of the profession to regulate the conduct of lawyers represent impor-
tant means for achieving that goal. Although many have shown that
lawyers have always been unpopular,396 the public's mistrust and dis-
like for lawyers is at an all-time high. From William Shakespeare 397 to
Samuel Taylor Coleridge3 98 to Jay Leno on late night television, law-
yers have long been the target of jokes399 and disdain.40 Nonetheless,
the level of disparagement today seems to have reached new levels, if
only because lawyers themselves have joined in the lawyer-bashing.
The mid-1990s witnessed the publication of several books written by
thoughtful and highly-regarded academics and lawyers that discussed
the decline in professionalism and the effect this decline will have on
393. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Pro-
fession (1993) (attributing the spiritual crisis affecting the legal profession to the col-
lapse of the ideal of the lawyer-statesman).
394. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Mod-
ern America (1976); William G. Ross, Finding the Lost Lawyers in a Civil Society, 26
Cumb. L. Rev. 851, 851-855 (1996).
395. See, e.g., Cooper & Humphreys, supra note 12, at 931 ("Respect for law itself
is at stake."); Croft, supra note 392, at 1350 (stating that a minimalist approach to
regulating ethics will result in negative public sentiment); Carl M. Selinger, The Pub-
lic's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the Legal Profession, 32 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 861, 871-880 (1997) (discussing the costs of the public's losing respect
for lawyers).
396. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 94-96 (2d ed. 1985).
397. "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." William Shakespeare, The
Second Part of King Henry the Sixth act 4, sc. 2, line 73 (Andrew S. Cairncross ed., 3d
ed., Harvard University Press 1957). Although some have tried to argue that Shake-
speare intended to portray lawyers as the protectors of the peace, most agree that
Shakespeare did not intend to paint lawyers in a positive light. See Croft, supra note
392, at 1257 n.4.
398. "He saw a Lawyer killing a Viper/On a dunghill hard by his own stable;/And
the Devil smiled, for it put him in mind/Of Cain and his brother Abel." Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, The Devil's Thoughts, in 1 The Complete Practical Works of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge 319, 320 (Ernest Hartley Coleridge ed., 1957).
399. See Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee
and its Discontents, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 457, 463-67 (1998) (cataloguing lawyer jokes).
Indeed, lawyer jokes can now be found on the internet. On one web page, one can
click on an icon of a shark wearing a necktie and carrying a briefcase to find a treas-
ury of lawyer jokes. See Nolo Press: Self-Help Law Center (visited Sept. 15, 1998)
<http://www.nolo.com>.
400. See Linowitz and Mayer, supra note 278, at 24; Myrna Oliver, Lawyers Losing
the Verdict in the Court of Public Opinion, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1987, at 3; Peter Pas-
sell, California Propositions are Antilawyer and No Joke, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1996, at
D2; John Stossel, Protect Us From Legal Vultures, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1996, at A8.
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society at large." 1 Indeed, lawyers themselves have complained that
standards of professionalism have fallen during the time they have
practiced law.4 °2
As I discussed earlier, the ethical codes have not been successful in
reining in the unprofessional conduct of many lawyers and Rule 11
has been a mixed blessing in that regard. Nonetheless, despite the
widespread perception that the profession is in trouble, there are
those who argue that professionalism has not declined; rather, the
demographics of the profession have changed, and changed for the
better. They argue that the so-called "Golden Age" of the profession
was dominated by the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elite from the
best schools.4" 3 The problem, this argument goes, is that all reform
efforts represent the elite's perceived need to control the conduct of
the growing numbers of non-Anglo-Saxon whites, especially Jews, wo-
men, and minority lawyers that have come into the profession. °
Others have argued that the "loss of faith" in the profession has
come about because the profession has experienced a Kuhnian "para-
digm shift,"'" 5 and that the shift to the "business paradigm" is a posi-
tive development. The "professionalism paradigm," was predicated
on the notion that the legal profession possessed esoteric knowledge
inaccessible to laypersons .406 This paradigm was born in the late nine-
teenth century when the elite leaders of the bar became concerned
that the profession's growing entrepreneurial aspects threatened its
public reputation. In response, the bar formulated codes of legal eth-
ics to regulate its members' conduct.0 7 In return for autonomous reg-
ulation of the bar, lawyers were to act as a profession for the good of
clients and society, rather than as a business." s
401. See Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the
Legal Profession is Transforming American Society (1994): Kronman, supra note 393;
Linowitz & Mayer, supra note 278.
402. See John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Re-
sponsibility and Implementing Change, 28 Val. U. L. Rev. 563, 570-73 (1994): Cooper
& Humphreys, supra note 12, at 923; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.. The Future of Legal
Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239, 1278-79 (1991).
403. See generally Auerbach, supra note 394, at 16 (describing a society in which
lawyers were praised as aristocrats yet honored for their common virtues): Ross,
supra note 394, at 851-855 (stating that the primary qualification for "Golden Age"
law firms was to consist of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants).
404. See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and
Bar Hierarchy, 28 Val. U. L. Rev 657, 693-96 (1994).
405. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift. IVh' Discarding Pro-
fessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1229, 1230 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Paradigm Shift]. See generally Thomas S.
Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 43-51 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that
different generations of scientists have different parigdims of research).
406. See Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 405, at 1231.
407. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Eth-
ics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 267-72 (1992).
408. See Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 405, at 1231.
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I do not think it is necessary to choose sides in these debates. The
real issue is not whether a more diverse profession is better than a
relatively homogeneous one-of course it is-or whether the legal in-
dustry is a profession or a business. Rather, the issue is whether cer-
tain conduct, no matter who engages in it, should be curbed. Because
the disciplinary codes have proven to be ineffective, and because Rule
11 has been a mixed blessing at best, the civility code approach has
appeared. Since Rule 11 was amended in 1983, over 120 bar associa-
tions and courts have adopted civility codes to deal with the unprofes-
sional conduct of their members.
Some argue that civility codes are simply the 1990s' equivalent of
earlier efforts of elite segments of the bar to "protect" the profession
from the less well-educated or less polished newcomers.4 °9 One com-
mentator has characterized civility codes as reflecting "unconscious
desires to impose a reactionary and authoritarian conformity upon a
rapidly diversifying profession and to resist redistributions of power to
those who have been historically excluded from the practice of law
and denied access to legal services., 411 Such characterizations, how-
ever, fail to deal with the reality that all segments of the profession
engage in Rambo-lawyering and other forms of unprofessional con-
duct.4 1' As I discussed in the Rule 11 context, there is a danger that
efforts at lawyer discipline will be used unprofessionally, and may
over-deter some lawyers.41 2 In my view, however, civility codes repre-
sent a positive alternative to the draconian compensatory sanctions
imposed by the courts in Rule 11's heyday, sanctions which resulted in
some cases in lawyers being financially unable to continue to practice
law. Especially to the extent that the codes are not enforceable, they
simply serve as a public statement that the profession is concerned
with its image as overly-contentious, rude, and dishonest.
It is not elitist to suggest that returning phone calls, addressing
one's adversary civilly, and being truthful is good practice. Indeed, it
is sad that lawyers need to be reminded of this. It is also true that
good manners, accompanied by a stab in the back, accomplish little
societal good. Nonetheless, promoting civility as a vehicle for improv-
ing professionalism is a worthy goal. As Aristotle's writings413 sug-
409. See Mashburn, supra note 404, at 663.
410. Id. at 664.
411. For example, there are legendary discovery battles between elite law firms.
See, e.g., Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1620-21 (1996) (examining cases involving discovery abuse); see
also Wilkins, supra note 4, at 842 n.192 ("[O]ne of the most significant accomplish-
ments of [Rule 11] is that, for the first time, a significant number of corporate clients
and lawyers are being required to account for their abusive behavior."). For a study
of large-law-firm attorneys' attitudes towards ethics and discovery, see Report, Ethics:
Beyond the Rules, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 691 (1998).
412. See Wilkins, supra note 4, at 842-43.
413. As Professor Yablon has told us, Aristotle is "hot" today. See Yablon, supra
note 411, at 1625-28.
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gest, abusive, overly aggressive, or contentious litigation tactics are
simply a form of "akrasia," i.e., "moral weakness" or "incontinence."
All lawyers know better, but they often lack the self-control to stop
themselves from engaging in ineffective or abusive conduct. To the
extent that civility codes make it fashionable again to behave in ways
less akrasiaticly, we will all be better off. Indeed, practicing random
acts of civility in today's climate generally will be an effective litiga-
tion tactic because it may well endear its practitioner to the court or
jury.
Of course, I am not so naive to believe that civility codes are a cure-
all. Incivility is a problem of society as a whole, not just the legal
profession. Indeed, one wonders whether the public really wants its
lawyers to behave civilly. As some T-shirts make clear, some clients
prefer pit-bull lawyering to a sober civil approach." 4 My own brother
complains that his lawyer is not tough enough because he does not
yell at his adversary and stomp around. Given what is at stake, how-
ever, it is certainly worth it for the profession to continue to try.
CONCLUSION
Overall, Rule 11 has been more effective in raising the profession's
ethical consciousness and in improving the standards of practice than
disciplinary enforcement has been. The Rambo-like use of Rule 11 by
too many lawyers, however, has resulted in increased acrimony within
the profession, thereby exacerbating the public's disenchantment with
it. Nonetheless, Rule 11 as it stands now, with its lessened emphasis
on compensatory sanctions and its new emphasis on curative sanc-
tions, along with the emergence of civility codes, may be more effec-
tive in curbing unprofessional conduct, which in turn, may help
restore public confidence in the profession. It is the responsibility of
all segments of the profession-judges, lawyers, and academics-to
continue to pay attention to the problem because the stakes are so
high. 415
In any event, even if these efforts do not succeed in restoring a posi-
tive public perception of the profession, perhaps they will make it
more rewarding to practice law again. Law is an "unhappy profes-
sion, '41 6 and lawyers are the most depressed occupational group.4 17
Studies have shown that at least as many lawyers leave the profession
each year, because of dissatisfaction with the practice of law, as are
414. For example, many of us have seen people wearing a T-shirt bearing the pro-
nouncement: "My lawyer can beat up your lawyer."
415. See Paul J. Kelly, Jr., A Return of Professionalism, Remarks at Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law 49th Annual Alumni Luncheon, Mar. 7, 1998, in 66 Fordham L
Rev. 2091, 2093-95 (1998); Dianne Jay Weaver, Boosting Our Public Image, Trial,
Aug. 1998, at 74, 74.
416. Linowitz & Mayer, supra note 278, at 242.
417. See id.
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admitted to law school. Even if the public is not convinced of the
value of lawyers, it is nevertheless worthwhile to try to make it more
rewarding for lawyers to practice law again.418
418. See Croft, supra note 392, at 1350-51.
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